Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-071 *13 April 1995*

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Berisha Meets With Turkish Defense Minister

LD1204204895 Tirana Radio Tirana in English 1830 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the morning of Wednesday, Albanian President Sali Berisha received the defense minister of Turkey, Mr. Mehmet Golhan. He thanked him for [words indistinct] he has provided Albania in this difficult period. He said that he was satisfied with the development of cooperation and friendship between our two countries, expressing conviction that the visit of Mr. Golhan would lead further ahead this cooperation.

Expressing satisfaction for the successful cooperation in the defense field and for the signing of some agreements between the two respective ministries, Berisha thanked Turkey for the aid it provides in the field of education of Albanian military cadres. The defense minister of Turkey, Mr. Golhan, transmitted to Mr. Berisha the cordial greetings of President [Suleyman] Demirel, Prime Minister [Tansu] Ciller and said that in the future, too, Turkey will continue to assist and support Albania, not only in the military field but on other fields as well.

President Berisha asked Mr. Golhan to transmit to President Demirel and Prime Minister Ciller his most cordial greetings and an invitation for visit to Albania in a time convenient to them.

Personnel Changes in Embassies Seen as 'Purging'

AU1304104595 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 4 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Plator Nesturi: "Chafing Under His Poor Results, Serreqi Vents His Anger at Albanian Embassies Abroad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A week can be full of surprises in the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in our diplomatic missions abroad. Although three weeks ago, at a meeting of his cabinet, Minister Serreqi stated that "the reform has been successfully carried out in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," it turns out that his conviction about the reform's efficiency in the Albanian diplomatic establishment was unfounded. No one can tell the real reason for the minister's hasty and unexpected suspicions, when, as is known, he has for a long time stubbornly played down "outspoken critics" of his foreign policy who describe it as diplomatic inflexibility and failure. Nevertheless, though not prompted by the abovementioned criticism, Serreqi has finally decided to act. His planned cutbacks will, however, affect not his ministry but our diplomatic missions abroad. Thus, internal sources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs say there will be a wave of purging in all Albanian embassies in the West and in neighboring countries, and there will be a great number of returned diplomats.

The reasons for this personnel cutback in our diplomatic missions are still unclear even to the ministry's staff itself, who are describing their chief's act as in accordance with Law 24/1 (according to which Serreqi, in his capacity as an employer, can do whatever he likes with his subordinates without being disturbed by the courts). According to this logic, since Serreqi himself makes no comments on his latest decisions, he appears in his new role of a typical employer, who gives explanations to nobody, if he so wishes.

The diplomats included in the minister's list have already begun to return home but no reason or motivation for their return has been given them. For many of them it is motivated by budget cuts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It can also be related to a previous meeting of the parliament's Foreign Policy Commission, which decided to cut the foreign policy budget funds. If this is the real reason for this cutback—when, as is known, the funds of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs make up 7 percent of the budget—then Serreqi's decision could be considered as a help given to the state at this period of economic austerity. However, the number of diplomats cut back is so big that it would be impossible for some of our embassies abroad to function normally. Thus, for example, the number of returned diplomats from our embassy in Rome totals six. On the other hand, there are other embassies where the number of diplomats has remained unchanged even though they are not as important as those in the Western countries. In addition to this, we have a total of three missions to Brussels: the Albanian Embassy to Belgium, the Embassy to the European Community, and our mission to NATO. So, in terms of savings, all this work in Belgium could be very well covered by a single embassy. Thus, the argument of financial cuts has nothing to do with the reduction in the number of diplomatic personnel in our embassies abroad.

Commenting on Serreqi's latest decision, one of the high-ranking officials, who has his office next to that of Mr. Serreqi, explained that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has decided not to respect the usual four-year stay of our diplomats in our missions abroad, reducing it to two years.

Such a motivation for the personnel cutbacks in our embassies abroad would cause nothing but a general confusion in these diplomatic missions. A two-year stay in these embassies would not give our diplomats the necessary time to perform their duties properly.

Bearing in mind that a newcomer in any embassy will need about one year to create the necessary connections with the political quarters of the country where he is working, then the remaining effective working time will be spent by him just to pack his luggage for his return home. In the meantime, the one who is to replace him will begin to do the same thing, in turn. In this way, Serreqi is applying in diplomacy the former criteria of evening schools (lessons the first evening and off the next evening).

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The new initiative by the foreign minister seems to find a better explanation in his readiness to satisfy the wishes of his close associates.

Some of the officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are overwhelmed with anxiety about the new appointments, whereas certain others have already bought new suits in the hope of being able to use them pretty soon in the days to come.

As can be seen, a short two-year stay in one of our embassies abroad is less disturbing and more comfortable than having a leading position in the ministry itself.

Thus, Serreqi is taking a new role, that of an employer, the boss, who considers jobs in embassies as a compensation to his vassals for their merits, and he cares little about promoting flexibility and a modern contemporary spirit in the work of our missions abroad.

Omonia Denies Links to Extremist Organizations

AU1204200995 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 6 Apr 95 p 1

[Article by "Ra.Ko.": "Omonia Has No Links Whatsoever to MAVI, While the Five (Greek-Speaking Albanians) Were Pardoned by the (Albanian) Justice System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Saranda—Omonia [political organization of the Greek minority in Albania] rejects charges of involvement in MAVI [Greek extremist organization] activities. Only one day after the sensational declarations by former Greek transport minister Pangalos on possible links between the five Greek-speaking Albanians pardoned by the Albanian [words indistinct] nationalistic commandos, the chairman of the association of the Greek minority in Albania, Mr. Qiriazati responded to these accusations in GAZETA SHQIPTARE, rejecting the attacks coming from Greece.

Having just returned from Greece after holding a series of meetings with high-ranking political personalities—among whom figured President Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister Papoulias, and Interior Minister Valerakis—the Omonia leader said: "To tell the truth, Pangalos has declared and declared so many things. However, as far as the five are concerned, the Albanian Court has made a decision. Albanian justice has pardoned them, and its decision is legal and real." Referring to his meetings in Greece, Qiriazati once again emphasized the following: "We have always declared ourselves against going to extremes."

At the same time, Qiriazati denied other allegations claiming that his organization has been created by Mitsotakis' New Democratic Party. "Omonia has been set up by our internal forces, by local activists, and not from outside. In January 1991, when our organization was founded, there were no external aspirations, and Albania's situation at that time required that minority rights be protected, but never at the expense of the Albanian people!" Qiriazati concluded.

Journalists Say Taxes Affecting Press Freedom

AU1304063095 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 4 Apr 95 p 2

[Statement by the Association of Professional Journalists of Albania in Tirana on 2 April: "Freedom of the Press Under the Heel of Absurd Taxes and Tariffs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the attention of Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi and Finance Minister Dylber Vrioni:

The European experience of treating the free press as a buttress of democracy has not yet been embraced by the Albanian Government. The Albanian print media, economically as poor as Albanian society itself, are being compelled to pay a number of taxes that do not exist even in the richest countries. Among such taxes, which have been suffocating the press and particularly the independent press for more than a year, are the following:

1. the 25-percent paper import tax, not to mention other customs duties on raw materials for printing

2. the 15-percent circulation tax

3. the 15-percent advertising tax

Last August, the Meksi government promised to consider urgently the possibility of reducing, suspending, or abolishing some of these taxes, which are both exorbitant and insulting to the role of the press in a democratic country.

In actual fact, not a single concrete step has been taken, while the financial situation has become increasingly precarious because of the steadily progressive increase in the tariffs on newspaper printing and distribution. During the first quarter of this year alone, the tariffs on the distribution agencies have increased by 30-40 percent, while on 1 April, because of the increase in the price of paper on the European market, the "Demokracia" printing house immediately increased its charges for printing newspapers, which under the new situation created by this shocking tariff are left with only the following two alternatives: either accept bankruptcy—not because of competition but because of economic censorship—or unsuccessfully raise the cover prices, which are already too high in terms of the purchasing power and income of Albanian citizens.

There is a third alternative though, which, albeit inadvisable as far as we as an association are concerned, in this situation is not to be totally ruled out—namely, the violation of the moral pact with the norms of ethics. [sentence as published] Our Association has achieved several successes in the international arena, including its

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admission as a full member in the International Federation of Journalists and the provision of with international cards to its members. On the domestic front, the Association has struggled to defend the freedom of expression and the continuing professionalism of the free press. Unfortunately though, the Association has failed to break the government's indifference and its general tendency to impose taxes on and discriminate against the independent and opposition press. Under these circumstances, the newspapers, determined to survive, understandably tend "to consult" the market. As long as the rules of the democratic game are not functioning in all its strands, theorizing about journalism sounds sterile and cynical, while hunger is the best sauce.

The Albanian printing press is very hungry. Our newspapers cannot afford to keep at least 50 percent of their staff. They do not have the financial resources to pay for the indispensable mechanisms of gathering and disseminating information. Shortages and poverty are systematically striking freedom of the press itself.

We want the government to realize that press freedom is not only the press's right to express whatever it likes, but also its duty to inform the public about everything that is happening. We want our government to realize that there is a direct link between the financial and the ethical aspects of the press.

We want our government to reassess the situation with the utmost seriousness. We propose that the government:

- —lift customs duties on paper and other imported press raw materials.
- —lifts, following the example of European countries, the circulation tariff on newspapers and the tax on advertisements.
- —look into the possiblity of temporarily subsidizing newspaper distribution by 30 percent.
- —honor the status of the "Demokracia" Printing House, which was set up as a foundation, so should pay neither taxes nor duties.

Appreciating the assistance given to us by the International Federation of Journalists and the Balkan Press Center, our Association begs them to consider as soon as possible the situation of the independent and opposition press in Albania, and make their contribution to its salvation.

[signed] Chairman Prenc Zogaj

This statement has also been sent to: The International Federation of Journalists, the Balkan Press Center, and the embassies of EU member countries in Albania.

Bank of Albania's Main Objectives for 1995

AU1304092295 Tirana LAJMI I DITES in Albanian 8 Apr 95 p 5

[Article by M. Noti: "The Monetary Policy and Its Anticipated Results for 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a recent declaration, the Bank of Albania states that its main objective is to ensure a monetary expansion, which, through a moderate consumption, aims to boost production in the presence of an acceptable inflation rate. The Bank of Albania says its economic targets for 1995 aim to increase employment through a qualitative and quantitative growth in general production, and to raise the general level of living standards. In the meantime, a balanced position in the foreign sectors of our economy, as well as stability in the purchasing power of the currency, will be maintained.

What Is the Position of the Albanian Bank in Terms of the Realization of This Policy?

Facilities to boost foreign trade, support to exchange activities, and the gradual elimination of restrictions on transfer of capital are some of the priorities that this institution is striving to realize, while securing a relatively stable level of prices in the market remains its main task. Nevertheless, a major problem for the Bank of Albania remains also finding adequate ways of paying the budget deficit, as the current situation of the extra reserves in the bank (financial means that are not used) does not reflect the real demand for them but is conditioned by the high value of this deficit. In order to cover this deficit, the government must reconsider the bank interest percentage, taking into consideration not only the official inflation but also the hidden one. The year of 1994 showed that the first step by which the government paid off its obligations to the Bank of Albania was realized by issuing bonds, which very soon will become a means of controlling the currency in the market. By the end of last year, the situation of the not-matured bonds was 900 million leks, a sum that makes up 9.7 percent of the total financing of the budget deficit.

The government's limit in direct credit will be dictated by objectives that will be set for the extra reserves. This year, the creation of the secondary market of bonds and the market of their [words indistinct] by the bank as the best method to help financing the budget deficit through the banking system. In the meantime, side by side with issuing Treasury Bonds the possibility of issuing other kinds of bonds is being considered.

'Massive' Damage to Telephone Lines Ignored

95P20708A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 8 Mar 95 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Massive Theft and Damage to National Communications Lines"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpts] During the first two months of 1995, some 15,000 linear meters of telephone wire were stolen and there has been no reaction from the organs of public order and of the local government, not even the imposition of fines. The above-ground communications lines that make up the main part of the existing transmission system are being damaged as soon as they are repaired. [passage omitted]

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There have been many cases where pilferage and damaging of telephone poles have been reported and condemned by telecommunications workers but there has been no reaction on the part of employees of the organs of public order and the local government. During January, some 13,000 linear meters of wire were stolen, including 5,750 meters in Tirana, 3,300 meters in Elbasan, 700 meters in Peshkopi, 600 meters in Korce, and 450 meters in Lac; 12,000 meters of wire were stolen in February, including 5,200 meters in Tirana, 900 meters in Kruje, 1,550 meters in Elbasan, 1,300 meters in Peshkopi and 600 meters in Librazhd. For almost 20 days in January, the telephone lines connecting Mat and Tirana were not in operation. The same was true for the Elbasan-Librazhd line. Damage to telephone poles in the villages of Libohove, Dropull, Grapsh, Gline, and Peshkepi caused the interruption of telephone connections, and at the same time, people took advantage of the situation to "add to their riches" with iron and wire.

Despite all this, so far this year—and last year, too—there has been no action by the forces of law and order, not even a fine (!).

"Over and over, we replace posts, restore connections, invest and spend funds, and do not make any money," the director general of Albanian telecommunications said. "If this process of destruction continues without end, then the telecommunications office has no intention of spending money for these lines, which have no guarantee," he added.

The installation of the automatic interurban and international central, alongwith the cable system of the urban networks and the installation of the transmitting and commutation system in the cities, makes it possible to set up 54,000 new telephone numbers for Tirana and 14 other cities. This new system promises to be more reliable because it will be better protected than the old system. In the beginning, it will be installed in Tirana and in 14 other cities in Albania. The rest of the country will remain under the old system for at least 10 years.

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'Lessons' in Zhelev's Korean, Mongolian Visits

AU1204131495 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 7 Apr 95 p 12

[Commentary by Georgi Apostolov: "One Visit—Two Lessons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelev's visit to South Korea and Mongolia, which ended on 6 April, allows two useful political lessons. The first is that the real foreign policy of a state should not have a single orientation. All political scientists have been predicting for a long time that the Asian-Pacific region will be the most important world region in the next century, and that Korea will be one of the most influential states. Therefore, the first visit of a Bulgarian head of state to Seoul was timely, something that was also reflected in the hosts' benevolent attitude.

The second example of the same lesson, although from a different direction, was the visit to Mongolia. Relations with the former socialist countries, developed for decades, have been imprudently and abruptly discontinued. Mongolia demonstrated that in addition to everything else, this also created a potentially rich soil for quarrels and misunderstandings, such as our disagreement on the mutual payments, and the unclear present and future situation of the plants constructed with Bulgarian aid and credits. Therefore Bulgaria must as soon as possible restore broken relations and actively seek an access to new regions in the world.

The second important lesson is related to the benefit of uniform actions on the part of state institutions and private business. The 20 businessmen who accompanied President Zhelev were afforded much more attention, and this allowed for holding serious and specific talks. Actually, precisely Korea is the example of what good results such a uniform attitude could provide.

Videnov Assesses Cabinet Activity, Acceptance

AU1204134795 Sofia REPORTER 7 in Bulgarian 7 Apr 95 p 7

[Interview with Prime Minister Zhan Videnov by Vanya Paunova; place and date not given: "Cabinet Is Too Strong for Groups"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Paunova] After the first half of the 100 days, are your expectations, as regards the cabinet, above or below par?

[Videnov] More than half of the 100 days has passed, and we have accomplished more than half of the work envisaged for the first 100 days. The mess we found proved to be greater than what we expected. The pleasant surprise was the fact that the public was prepared, beyond our expectations, to work in a constructive, specific, and responsible manner. The degree to which society understands its real problems is lower than what we have expected, and this frankly, concerns me more and more. I think that there is a single superimportant document during our first 100 days: our government program. It will reflect everything. We have few illusions. Our preliminary assessment of the situation in the country proved rather realistic. Our program will contain what is possible today and what we intend to do in the next two to three years.

[Paunova] Do you expect greater criticism from the left or from the right?

[Videnov] I expect criticism from all sides, and simultaneously—from nowhere. This is what I meant when I mentioned the low degree of understanding of the problems on the part of society. Unfortunately, both fierce criticism and the absence of any criticism are futile. One of our cabinet's most important tasks will be to focus society's attention on the problems that really are most important. This will direct the fire to a certain degree toward the cabinet. I do not think that it can be a teacher, mentor, or guru to our nation. It must have the freedom of choice, and this means the freedom to express opinions and choose between alternatives. However, I would be happy if we could outline at least one alternative in a clear and essential manner.

[Paunova] It was not only the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] voters who expected drastic steps against crime from the cabinet. Are you satisfied with the achievements in this sphere?

[Videnov] I am satisfied with one thing only: There appears to be a growing respect in the criminal world toward the possibilities for the law to struggle against crime. The self-confidence of the organs of law and order in efficiently performing their duties has increased. This is a good beginning. The specific results are yet to emerge. I think that we will cope with brutal, organized, and impudent crime within a brief period of time.

[Paunova] Many people are asking themselves whether the cabinet or the groups will rule in the next few years.

[Videnov] I do not see any threat in this respect. This cabinet is too strong for the groups. I am saying this with a certain degree of regret, because this is a conclusion that reflects the weakness of Bulgarian private business today, but this is the real situation. I see no possibility of private business's exercising even partial influence on the cabinet, parliament, or municipal authorities.

[Paunova] Mr. Brzezinski was rather sharp regarding the socialist cabinet's White Paper. It is obvious that every step by the cabinet will be examined under a magnifying glass for traces of "revenge" policy. How do you intend to defend your position before our society and prove that you really are a democratic government?

[Videnov] I will defend our position before the people who have read our White Paper. I do not think that he has read it.

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[Paunova] On which of your advisers do you rely without any reservations?

[Videnov] I rely only on those dozens or hundreds of people whom I meet every week for various reasons. I hope I have good instincts.

[Paunova] Are you concerned by certain trends in the BSP?

[Videnov] Yes, I am concerned by more than one or two trends, but I do not think that any of them is lethal.

[Paunova] The impressions emerges that the opposition is trying to monopolize the initiative on our integration into NATO....

[Videnov] We cannot divide the great Euro-Atlantic idea between two superpowers, or become supporters or opponents of that idea. We are firm supporters of Bulgaria's participation in the Euro-Atlantic integration processes. The institutional power of the government and the parliamentary majority is sufficient to ensure a great advantage vis-a-vis any competition. Nevertheless, we welcome, and would even encourage, any competition in this direction, because this is something useful.

[Paunova] You apologized for the Bulgarian Communist Party's sins during the years of its absolute power. From the White Paper, one could conclude that almost exclusively good deeds were performed during that period. Why, actually, did you apologize, then?

[Videnov] The apology was necessary because this is not the conclusion the White Paper prompts. It was not our goal to assess the transition but rather to outline the present situation in the country. We must point out the origin of the problems whenever this is possible. Wherever this is impossible, or we are incapable of doing it, we leave it to the readers to draw their own conclusions. I do not think that the senseless character of the changes that began after 10 November 1989 is the final conclusion of the White Paper. The criticism of the transition mode is grave, but it must be taken into consideration that the very existence of a mode accepted by society is questionable. I think the formation of such a mode in the people's awareness is just beginning now.

Minister Views Foreign Economic Priorities

AU1204135295 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Apr 95 p 3

[Interview with Kiril Tsochev, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign economic relations, by Sonya Kostadinova; place and date not given: "Our Foreign Economic Relations Have Clear Priorities"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Kostadinova] How would you assess the visit to South Korea that just ended?

[Tsochev] I would not use any special superlatives. The basic goal was to activate our economic relations. Both governments assess the current trade exchange as insufficient. Korea is very active in the Bulgarian market but has not invested a single cent in Bulgaria. It was my task to begin a dialogue precisely in this direction. I briefed Seoul business circles on our government's program, which we will prepare on the basis of the program declaration, the draft budget, and the stability we expect to achieve by the end of our four-year mandate. [passage omitted]

[Kostadinova] What is the place of the Pacific region in the cabinet's trade priorities?

[Tsochev] This region is not a basic priority. You know that we stress the Central and East European states, the Balkan peninsula, and the European structures. The countries of the Far East do not represent a significant percentage of our foreign trade. I do not think that this will change in the future. However, relations with those countries could have a significant role in the investment and privatization process in Bulgaria.

[Kostadinova] What do you think about China?

[Tsochev] I will meet with the Chinese deputy prime minister today. We have a serious interest in China, and the dialogue with China must be very constructive and active. China is a great market with a very important role in the world economy in recent years. The Western states are pursuing the Chinese market very energetically, and I think that we should do the same.

[Kostadinova] Is a highest-level visit to China imminent?

[Tsochev] At present there are no plans for such a visit, but it would be appropriate to organize one.

[Kostadinova] How would you assess the cabinet's 100 days in the sphere of trade?

[Tsochev] As very difficult. The White Paper took up a lot of our time. It is not a critical analysis of the past, as some people maintain, but an analysis of the present situation. The budget also was an important task of the government's, and the attempt to develop a dialogue with countries that are very important to our trade—such as Germany, the European structures, Greece, and Russia—also have required much time and effort. The first 100 days actually are the preparation for our governing efforts during the next four years. I think that the cabinet is working with much ambition and great willingness, despite strong external opposition. [passage omitted]

[Kostadinova] In Bulgaria we usually accuse each other of working without a strategy in all areas. Did you specify your priorities for the next four years?

[Tsochev] By the end of April we will publish our program for our mandate. We have certain basic priorities in the sphere of trade and foreign economic cooperation, and we adhere to them. In addition there are countries and markets with which we must develop

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relations, increase our exports through export stimulation, and increase the export shares in our budget revenue. For example, the Russian market needs Bulgarian goods to be marketed, and we need Russian raw materials and other materials to be marketed in our country. The trade exchange with Russia decreased dramatically down to 1.8 billion [currency not specified] in 1994. We will try to liberalize our mutual trade.

Army Commander on Obstacles to Reform

AU1204133895 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 10 Apr 95 p 3

[Interview with Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov, commander of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army, by Vacho Radulov; place and date not given: "Lack of Money and Law Hinders Military Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Radulov] People are saying that Army reform has stopped. What is the truth?

[Totomirov] The Army cannot reform itself without taking into account current problems in the country. It is a part of society and can change only as quickly as society restructures itself. In addition, changes in the Army depend on material and financial means that the country allocates for this purpose. I have already said that military reform is not a single measure but a process. Army reform has not stopped. Its pace has simply slowed down. It is well known that the Defense Ministry and the Bulgarian Army General Staff have worked out constituent documents for implementing Army reform. The Defense and Armed Forces Bill is ready, and we have been assured that it will be submitted to the National Assembly soon. The concept for developing the Bulgarian Army until the year 2000 and the military doctrine, which was approved by the government in 1994, are also ready. We have prepared new charters, regulations, courses, programs, and other documents, which will be updated after the adoption of the defense bill, and activated then. A military education system reform plan has also been adopted. Certain enterprises included in the reform's structure that did not require much expenditure have been implemented. Thus, many units from all branches have been restructured and their payroll reorganized. New units have been formed. The military-medical establishment has been reorganized. The structure and composition of the command structures have been optimized. We will begin now to reorganize the Army commands in the corps, and form brigades and ground troops on the basis of some of the existing territorial training centers. The implementation of those structural reforms does not depend on the General Staff alone. The willingness to implement reforms and reform plans is not enough to restructure, redeploy, and rearm the Army. In addition, the reform plan does not have sufficient legal basis to implement the reforms. We need a solid legal basis for implementing the reforms. I want to be correctly understood. The time when many tasks could be resolved in the Army on the basis of the one-man-command principle that used to exist in the Army is over. The one-man-command principle exists even today, and is necessary, but it must be incorporated within the framework of the modern legal system. The fact that such constituent documents as the national security doctrine, the military doctrine, the defense and Armed Forces bill, and ensuing legislative decrees have not been adopted, does not allow us to update military reform enterprises and practically deprives the Defense Ministry and Bulgarian Army General Staff leaderships of the necessary legal basis for implementing reforms and bringing Bulgaria's military infrastructure into accordance with modern requirements.

[Radulov] Does anything else hinder the complete implementation of reform in the Army?

[Totomirov] I do not think there is anything else. The legal foundation and the money are the stumbling block. [passage omitted]

Visiting Armenian President Addresses Legislature

AU1204185495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the National Assembly was visited by Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who also addressed the members.

In his speech, the Armenian president pointed out that the two countries countries are struggling against the consequences of the totalitarian system. However, in addition to the understandable difficulties related to the transition period, Armenia is also experiencing the consequences of the grave earthquake and problems related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Mr. Ter-Petrosyan announced that his country has no territorial claims. He explained that there is a strong presidential government in Armenia; there have been no early parliamentary elections. The next elections, which will take place soon, will be conducted mainly on the basis of the majority system.

News Conference Concludes Visit

AU1204185695 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The official visit of Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan to Bulgaria ended.

Presidents Ter-Petrosyan and Zhelyu Zhelev assessed the results of the visit exceedingly highly. A Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation has been signed, as well as nine additional agreements in the fields of finance, transportation, justice, and agriculture. This is the judicial framework of future Bulgarian-Armenian relations, President Ter-Petrosyan said. From now on it is up to

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our countries' governments and businessmen to fill this framework with actual substance, President Zhelev added.

At the concluding news conference, Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan expressed great satisfaction with his talks with Prime Minister Videnov, National Assembly Chairman Sendov, and the Bulgarian businessmen. Presidents Zhelev and Ter-Petrosyan have expressed differences only on the issue of Armenian participation in Black Sea economic cooperation. According to President Zhelev, without turning our back on the possibilities of regional cooperation, Bulgaria nevertheless views its membership in the EU as its basic priority. However, Armenia, which has no direct possibility of integrating into the EU but rather an indirect possibility through the CIS, Black Sea economic cooperation is an ample opportunity of maintaining contacts at the regional level.

Those are two different positions, but they do not contradict each other, Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan said in conclusion.

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CEZ Holding Talks on Importing Uranium

AU1204131395 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 10 Apr 95 p 3

[Article by Jana Francikova: "CEZ Wants To Diversify Uranium Suppliers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] CEZ [Czech Power Generating Plants] would like to purchase abroad at least 40 percent of the overall uranium required for generating domestic nuclear power. When the Temelin nuclear power plant is brought into operation, uranium requirements will reach some 690 metric tons per annum, so the imports should involve 270 metric tons. "We have been holding talks with the Trade and Industry Ministry since last year on authorizing imports; so far, however, we have not reached a conclusion," said Miroslav Sedina, the CEZ company's specialist for purchasing nuclear materials and services, to HOSPODARSKE NOVINY. The reason CEZ wants to purchase part of its uranium abroad is, according to him, its attempt to diversify uranium sources and more advantageous prices on the world market.

About 600 metric tons of uranium is mined in the Czech Republic per annum, which is less than the anticipated requirement following the activation of Temelin; CEZ, however, should have the possibility to make purchases from the State Material Reserves. Its uranium stockpile currently amounts to more than 2,500 metric tons. Moreover, current consumption amounts to half the uranium mined. An agreement has been concluded to supply the Dukovany nuclear power plant with 333 metric tons this year. The price of Czech uranium is, however, twice that of world prices. Last year, the price of uranium mined in our country exceeded 1,700 korunas [Kc] per kilogram; however, it was possible to purchase 1 kg on world markets for approximately Kc700.

The low price on world markets is influenced, first and foremost, by cheap uranium exports from the countries of the former Soviet Union and by the possibilities for its reprocessing from nuclear weapons within the framework of the demilitarization programs. On the other hand, the high price in our country is influenced by the low uranium content in the mined ore. The reduction in mining and cleaning up the environment in the area around the mines are also financially demanding; this will amount to almost Kc4.0 billion from the state budget this year alone.

The purchase of Czech uranium will be reflected in the CEZ budget over the course of three years by increased costs of Kc1.0 billion. However, if the talks on imports are unsuccessful, this expenditure would not, according to M. Sedina, be projected into electricity prices because they are regulated by the Finance Ministry.

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National Security Head Views Tasks, Prospects

AU1304104695 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 12 Apr 95 pp 1, 12

[Interview with Istvan Nikolits, minister without portfolio in charge of the National Security Office, by Katalin Palffy; place and date not given: "Every Country Needs a Secret Service"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Palffy] Your appointment as minister came at a difficult time. Almost simultaneously with your appointment, you are expected to show spectacular results in curbing the black economy. What role do you attribute to the National Security Office in this task? Are you aware of Peter Zwack's idea on creating a special organization to deal with this?

[Nikolits] I am aware of Peter Zwack's proposal, and my ideas are almost similar to his, although we have not coordinated our positions. Some four organizations deal with this issue in Hungary: the police, the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing [APEH], the national headquarters of the Customs and Revenue Police, and the National Security Office. In my opinion, these four organizations can cooperate successfully even without new resources. Good working relations must be created in order to make the flow of incoming information available to one another.

[Palffy] In what organizational framework would all this happen?

[Nikolits] A coordination body would be set up on the basis of a consensus among the leaders. This body should receive all the available information. The essential thing is to set up an efficient organization made up of the best professionals and covering all the aforementioned institutions.

[Palffy] When can such an organization be set up?

[Nikolits] As soon as possible.

[Palffy] Is there any chance for this? Does the interior minister agree with the plan?

[Nikolits] I hope he does. I do not see any reason why he should not agree.

[Palffy] Would the team be made up only of members of the aforementioned institutions?

[Nikolits] Basically yes, but this does not mean that other organizations would be excluded from participating in certain cases. Only those institutions would participate in the everyday work, however.

[Palffy] On the basis of your experience, do you agree with the assumption that the bulk of the black economy is controlled by 200-300 people?

[Nikolits] I do not know. Time will tell. In any case, I would like to speak about them in the past tense. [passage omitted]

[Palffy] How can parliament supervise the activity of secret services?

[Nikolits] I am very serious about parliamentary control, and I stick to this. Supervising the secret services cannot be the privilege of one person or one party. The nine-member six-party National Security Office is suitable to assert some kind of public control. I would like to share responsibility with the committee on every issue that can be dangerous to the society.

[Palffy] If someone notices abuses in this area, to whom can he turn?

[Nikolits] I would like to see this committee become a forum where every citizen or organization can ask for an investigation if he faces any harassment or illegal action on the part of the secret services. The committee would have the right to look into every specific case. [passage omitted]

[Palffy] On the basis of what notification does the National Security Office initiate an investigation against a person? Do you also react to anonymous complaints?

[[Nikolits] This office has a complaints bureau and many calls come in there. I can assure everyone that these complaints get to professional people who can decide whether the issue in question is based on something real and whether it is worth dealing with.

[Palffy] What guarantees that no one can use secret service means for political goals?

[Nikolits] I give personal guarantees for this. As long as I am the minister, these services can only carry out the tasks they were set up for. These means cannot be used without justification, and I also mean political goals here.

[Palffy] This will probably not appease everyone, because the minister might change.

[Nikolits] The parliament is the other guarantee, because it controls the secret services. However, we must accept the fact that the secret service is the most effective means of protecting the internal and external security of a country. A secret service can only function as long as it remains secret, and this requires the citizens' confidence. [passage omitted]

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UK's Hurd on Poland's EU, NATO Membership

LD1204224895 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 12 Apr 95

[From the "Panorama" program; relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Krystyna Czubowna] Great Britain is convinced that Poland will become a full member of NATO and the EU, British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd has said in Warsaw. In a special interview for the "Panorama" program, Minister Hurd said that the entry of Poland into NATO will not be an act that is hostile toward Russia.

[Correspondent] President Lech Walesa, receiving Douglas Hurd, stressed that Poland wishes to impart dynamism to the processes of integration on our continent. We wish to live in a Europe that is prosperous and secure. This idea still has its opponents, which is why it ought not to be eliminated, stressed Lech Walesa. Despite the working character of the visit, Hurd was also received by Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. London is signaling that Poland will be one of the first new members when NATO and the EU mark out a timetable for the widening of their ranks. However, particularly in the case of the EU, the process of integration requires many activities on both sides. Poland must adapt itself to the requirements of the EU, the EU must for instance correct its agricultural policy, Hurd told the Polish head of diplomacy, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Jacek Biernacki, in English, with superimposed Polish translation] Skeptics in Poland have been saying that, for the United States, Central Europe has significance only as a fragment of Russian policy. How does British foreign policy resolve this?

[Hurd, in English, with superimposed Polish translation] We favor with unchanging strength the widening of NATO and the EU, and so as to include Poland too. Your neighbors as well, but above all to include Poland. We even feel that this is a part of a unique service for Europe, to widen the zone of stability and prosperity to the central part of the continent, with all the faults and advantages of that which we have ourselves experienced.

[Biernacki] What do you think of the Russian claims that the existence of NATO hinders the construction of a European system of security, that the widening of NATO will bring about the withdrawal of Moscow from the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe? Does the West take this seriously?

[Hurd] The expansion of NATO, to include Poland as well, is not an act that is hostile toward Russia. We simply affirm the fact that the world continues to be a dangerous place, that NATO is the most effective organization for collective security in the world, and that Poland, for historical reasons, wishes to and ought to join the alliance. I think we have adopted a clear line of behavior toward the Russians: You do not have a right of veto toward the widening of NATO, and we do not wish to surprise you, to show you hostility, to invade the heart of your country like Napoleon and Hitler. We want to cooperate with you, the Russians, in the framework of the CSCE, the framework of the agreements on nuclear disarmament, the framework of Partnership for Peace. We want good relations, but we will not permit Russia to decide whether we are to accept new members.

[Biernacki] What faults and advantages might Poland present as a future member of NATO and the EU, from the British point of view?

[Hurd] Europe is not complete without Poland, and we want a complete Europe. Poland has already fulfilled the political conditions for joining the EU. There are still the economic criteria to be fulfilled, and that needs time. We must, in any case, change ourselves.

[Biernacki] What is the British vision of the future of the EU? Should it be like the United States of Europe, or perhaps like the Common Market?

[Hurd] No one is talking now about the United States of Europe. Chancellor Kohl even promised not to use this term any more. We do not resemble Massachusetts or Rhode Island, after all. We are different nations; we have different constitutions and legislation; and we speak different languages. That will remain. But as Europeans we are uniting more effectively than anybody ever expected. We had and still have quite a lot to do: trade, common market, foreign policy. We sign agreements and act jointly. The Maastricht Treaty created a new European architecture, the institution of the European Union, joint trade, and markets. We accept these and we want to make a success of it.

[Biernacki] Your private opinion about the possibility of inviting Poland to next year's intergovernmental conference on EU reform and about chances for the expansion of NATO and the union in about the year 2000.

[Hurd] I think it will be difficult for Poland, which is not a member of the EU, to take part in such a conference. As regards timing, you are asking me for my private opinion, although on television it is difficult to be a totally private person. I will say, however, that before your NATO membership your EU membership may come. And I assume that this may take place just before of just after the turn of the century.

[Biernacki] Are you satisfied in the UK that, during the London ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, Poland will be represented by the minister of foreign affairs and not by President Lech Walesa?

[Hurd] The president explained to me today why he felt he had to stay in Poland. I understand those arguments and I respect them. If President Lech Walesa does not

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come, Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski will be welcomed just as warmly. Mr. Bartoszewski is the appropriate person: A former resistance member, an Auschwitz prisoner, he knows everything about the British contribution to the victory. He will be a very distinguished and suitable representative of Poland in London. [end recording] (endall) 121900 goodfellow/px 12/2250

Foreign Minister on NATO, Ties to EU, Russia

BR1304100695 Brussels LE SOIR in French 12 Apr 95 p 2

[Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski by Pol Mathil; place and date not given: "Wladyslaw Bartoszewski on the Desire To Mark his Difference in Poland and Abroad"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mathil] Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy has chosen Brussels, the capital of the European Union and NATO, for his first trip. His communist predecessors used to take their first trip to Moscow, while the Solidarity leaders would go to the Vatican. Is there more than a symbolic element in this change?

[Bartoszewski] Of course. In this choice there was a happy coincidence (of formal pretexts) and also a profound conviction and strong insistence on the part of the foreign minister. Indeed, I would have chosen Brussels, which to me seems perfectly logical, even without any pretext. For Mr. Oleksy, given his political origin, it was an excellent opportunity to proclaim his European faith.

[Mathil] Does not this government's postcommunist origin hinder it in its relations with the West?

[Bartoszewski] No. Obviously in certain circles it leads to people asking questions and even to distrust. People abroad ask me many questions, and I am asked to interpret certain decisions. I will repeat, however, that so far this government has not done anything that is incompatible with its international commitments.

[Mathil] So how do you explain the West's hesitance vis-a-vis Poland, even though Poland meets all of the economic criteria (growth) and political criteria (democracy) for membership?

[Bartoszewski] I think there are material and psychological reasons for this. At the European level, the financial aspects, the "cost" of membership, which in my opinion are clearly overestimated, account for a major part of this caution. Similarly, there is the scope of the various tactical aspects: which countries, how many countries, etc.

[Mathil] That is in regard to the European Union and economic integration. What about NATO?

[Bartoszewski] I believe that Russian pressure against enlargement plays a considerable role in NATO's "caution." Certain circles in the West are of the opinion that NATO should not be enlarged before the European Union, precisely because of Russia's reservations.

[Mathil] Are you aware of the rumors that Russia is ready to accept the membership in NATO of small countries that do not border Russia, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, but under no circumstances Poland or the Baltic states?

[Bartoszewski] I can neither confirm nor deny these rumors. However, in many talks, people have made it clear to me that Poland's membership is the core of the enlargement problem. No official, not even in Moscow, believes that NATO represents any kind of danger to Russia. However, as you know, Russia has one of the best diplomatic services. After all, did it not succeed in placing the Russian question, Russia's needs, and its strictly domestic problems right at the center of the entire world's concerns? I therefore think that the negotiation process on enlargement is, for Moscow, a less obvious objective than enlargement itself. It is a matter of cost and new concessions by the West. It is also a chance to weaken NATO and provoke conflict among NATO members.

Mr. Oleksy was right when he said in Brussels that the longer the membership process, the stronger Russian pressure will become. Having said that, in both cases, in the debate on Poland's access to NATO and the EU, the West very easily forgets what it itself called the "peace dividend," and in particular our role at the end of communism and the Soviet empire.

[Mathil] Exactly. You have already been to Bonn. You are in Brussels, and you will soon be in Washington. But what about Moscow?

[Bartoszewski] I have spoken with my counterpart, Mr. Kozyrev, and I can call it a promising conversation. I told him that Stalin and Dzierzynski (who was of Polish origin and created the political police in the USSR) do not, after all, represent our two peoples. We are keeping in touch, and we will meet again very soon.

[Mathil] Does Russia's veto of Poland's membership in NATO weigh heavily on you?

[Bartoszewski] Psychologically, yes—especially on public opinion in Poland. [passage omitted]

Defense Deputy Minister on Talks With NATO

WS1304104295 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 12 Apr 95 p 3

[Statement by Polish Deputy Defense Minister Jan Kuriata, "noted" by Jan Forowicz: "Jan Kuriata on His Meeting With Parliament Members of the Subcommission of Convergence and East-West Economic Cooperation of the North Atlantic Assembly; NATO's Interest in Poland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During a recent visit by a group of parliament members from NATO's advisory body, I

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had an opportunity to familiarize myself with some of the problems related to the "Partnership for Peace" and transformations in the Armed Forces of the Polish Army.

At a meeting with Mr. Julio M. Calha, chairman of the subcommission, as well as with the other parliament members, I presented a strategic goal, which envisions that the construction of Poland's security would be based on three foundations: our own defense potential, our future membership in NATO, and an absolutely friendly partnership with our neighbors. I also informed the guests about the bilateral agreements that have been concluded with many countries in the area of military cooperation, especially with NATO states and our neighbors.

I familiarized our guests with our system of international agreements and bilateral contacts, including those with NATO states. Generally speaking, they serve the purpose of opening new possibilities of cooperation and strengthening trust in Poland's defense policies. It is of a definitely nonreclaiming nature. It is, in fact, free from all elements that might be potential sources of conflicts in our relations with neighbors, both those who are very close to us and those whose territories are farther away.

Since 1989 we have been thoroughly restructuring the defense planning system, the managing organs of the National Defense Ministry [MON], and the Armed Forces themselves. In this area we emphasize the need to obtain full civil control over the Army. This control would be exercised first of all by means of methods of forming the defense doctrine, the methodology of specifying the level of budgetary financial resources that would allow for views expressed by democratically elected authorities, and other projects implemented especially together with parliament members from the National Defense Committee of the Sejm and Senate.

It took quite a lot of time for us to present more specific examples of the transformations. I said that an example of such transformations is the fact that MON increasingly often takes into account the rules of a market economy. One such rule is the observance of the law on public orders [zamowienia publiczne], which entered into force on 1 January. I spoke about transferring the main burden of the task of protecting the troops—from the field system to stationary military units and to logistical subunits of the tactical level. This is in line with the model adopted by Western countries.

There was also enough time to inform the guests about the reorganization of the military education system and about the exchange of education programs. I recalled that the Polish Army already has 300 officers who were trained in academies in the United States, France, and Germany.

We familiarized our guests with the first liaison undertakings made between our military structures and the Planning and Coordination Cell at the Chief Headquarters of the Joint Armed Forces in Europe. I devoted quite a lot of time to the participation of the Polish Army in approximately 260 undertakings in Partnership for Peace this year.

I did not conceal what is unsatisfactory to us. For example, I told them that there are problems in the restructuring process, such as the excessive infrastructure left over by both the Polish Army and military units of the Russian Federation.

I was asked, among other things, how we were going to resolve the problem of considerable expenditures that are needed to adapt the equipment of our Army to standards in NATO armies. I replied: Replacement of equipment is a continuous process in all modern armies. Appropriate sums of money are always put aside for this purpose. Right now we are simply introducing new weapons and some new equipment, but we must pay special attention to priorities because our needs are greater than our possibilities.

First of all, we drew attention to the compatibility with NATO countries in such areas as commanding and air control. We are making increasingly more efforts to place more orders for our Army in the domestic arms industry. At this point it is worth recalling that vital processes of legal-organizational restructuring and processes involving a conversion of the production profile have been going on in this branch of industry for a few years now.

I expressed the conviction that the development of the Polish economy and the recently adopted resolution of the Sejm, which crowned the debate on defense, would result in an improvement of the financial situation of the Defense Ministry.

Walesa Calls 'Postcommunists' Dangerous Phenomenon

LD1204212495 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview with the Catholic Information Agency, President Lech Walesa has said that the present government of postcommunists is a dangerous phenomenon for the development of the country. These are people like Jerzy Urban [government press spokesman during the 1980's], Walesa said, and added that every one of them might turn out to be an Urban and then go on to act the same. The president stated that it cannot be the case that such criminals, still perpetrating crimes, continue to function. He stressed that this is something drastic for all of us.

To the question of who will vet them, a court or the people, the president replied it is the people, to whom the courts are subordinated.

Walesa did not give an unambiguous answer to the question of whether he will run in the presidential election.

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[Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish at 1730 GMT on 12 April, relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network, adds the following: "In an interview for the Catholic Information Agency, President Lech Walesa has termed Aleksander Kwasniewski, Jerzy Urban, and Prime Minister Oleksy people without principles, who have rendered themselves devoid of all values. The president said that the rule of postcommunists is dangerous for the development of the country."]

Comments Criticized

LD1204220395 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1900 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Jerzy Szmajdzinski, secretary general of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, has said he is dumbfounded by Lech Walesa's statement. The president has probably lost the ability to control himself, the Democratic Left Alliance deputy said. He added that, in his opinion, the statement by the president was absurd, harmful, and totally unnecessary.

Jerzy Urban also commented on the matter:

[Begin Urban recording] The inclusion of my name alongside the names of the leader of the parliamentary majority and the prime minister to describe a three-man criminal gang, irrespective of the context, has tickled my vanity. My name has been put together with the eminent names of Kwasniewski and Oleksy in order to humiliate them. This means that the president of the Polish Republic has already started the election competition and that he has embarked on it with the elegant characteristic of the Wolomin mafia. Although one can detect here also the style of the Pruszkow gang. I am not surprised by it. [end recording]

Oleksy Advises Walesa To Attend WWII Ceremonies

LD1204134395 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In a letter to President Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy has said that he believes it is advisable to accept the invitation for his participation in the ceremonies to mark the end of World War II in Moscow on 9 May.

In my opinion, in view of the historical facts and in order to emphasize the role and contribution of Polish soldiers to the victory over fascism, the participation of a high-ranking Polish state official is necessary at the place where, 50 years after the end of the war, the presidents and prime ministers of the victorious states will gather to express their solidarity, Jozef Oleksy has written to Lech Walesa.

In his letter to the president, the prime minister has also said that, in his opinion, it is important that, for the benefit of Polish-Russian relations and also in order to clarify Poland's position on the issue of our integration with Europe, particularly, as he emphasizes, after his visit to Brussels, to explain to Russia, frequently and patiently, our interests and intentions.

Walesa Aide on Election, Presidential Powers

WS1204135595 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Apr 95 p 3

[Interview with Tomasz Kwiatkowski, newly appointed legal adviser to Polish President Lech Walesa, by Agnieszka Kublik; place and date not given: "I Will Do What the Boss Tells Me To Do"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kublik] You like to stress your loyalty to Walesa. Will you execute all decisions made by the president?

[Kwiatkowski] The president makes only legal decisions. After all, he would not order me to "kill." If he did, it is obvious I would not obey. Besides, your question is rhetorical. As you know, Walesa is always right.

[Kublik] What if you have any doubts about whether a decision is indeed legal?

[Kwiatkowski] If those doubts are grounded, I believe the boss could be persuaded to back away from such a decision.

[Kublik] Do you not fear that you will become yet another "bumper" for Walesa?

[Kwiatkowski] That is one of the elements of this game.

[Kublik] Do you agree with that?

[Kwiatkowski] No, but such is the need of the moment. I believe in Lech Walesa. It is my form of patriotism.

If I am not backed by any social force, if I am not a politician, I am an instrument. I realize that there are situations in which I am a useful tool and others in which I am not. At least for the sake of a political contract. Then the contract becomes more important than the tool.

If I am told "farewell," I will not blame anyone.

[Kublik] Who will win the presidential election?

[Kwiatkowski] Walesa. I have no doubt about that. As a lawyer, I must ask myself: "Who could beat him?" I do not see anyone capable of that. It will definitely not be Kuron, Kwasniewski, or Strzembosz.

[Kublik] When should the election be held?

[Kwiatkowski] At a time that best suits the president.

[Kublik] When would that be?

[Kwiatkowski] I do not know. That is a political decision that the boss, not an official, has to make.

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[Kublik] The boss says that the presidential term in office should be prolonged, that a new constitution should be passed first, and only then can presidential elections be held.

[Kwiatkowski] That would be a very rational sequence of events, but it is difficult for me to say whether this will be the case.

[Kublik] What if the boss says: "Please prolong my term in office"?

[Kwiatkowski] I doubt that the boss wants to prolong his term. If he does, I will think about it. Currently, I do not believe it would be possible. I am not a constitutional expert, however. That was the realm of Leszek Falandysz. Do you want me to show you that I have a copy of the small constitution in my briefcase? I have yet to study it.

[Kublik] What authority should the president have?

[Kwiatkowski] As much as possible. I do not think it is possible to rule through 560 people. There should be a very strong president, and the parliament should serve only as a means of control, as in the U.S. system, where the president holds all executive powers and heads up the government. That is the most efficient model, in my belief. I am an autocrat.

[Kublik] You have replaced Professor Lech Falandysz. Is he your guru? An expert on "Falandization"?

[Kwiatkowski] He is a good friend of mine. I think he is a very skilled lawyer and just as good at interpreting the law as I am. Only Leszek and I can "Falandize."

[Kublik] Falandysz left because he could not approve of [head of the President's Office] Mieczyslaw Wachowski's methods. Do you approve of them?

[Kwiatkowski] For the time being, I cannot say that I do not approve of them. I have yet to work with him as closely as Falandysz has.

[Kublik] But you have known him for a long time. What do you think of him?

[Kwiatkowski] I think of him in the best of terms.

Daily Views Walesa's New Legal Aide

WS1304104195 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 12 Apr 95 p 2

[Biographical note by Rafal Szubstarski: "Profile: Tomasz Kwiatkowski"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tomasz Kwiatkowski, having resigned his membership in the National Radio and Television Council [KRRiTV], was appointed under secretary of state in the President's Chancellery yesterday. His prerogatives are to be the same as those of his predecessor Lech Falandysz (who resigned, saying he was "no longer able to tolerate [head of the President's Office] Mieczyslaw Wachowski's methods")—coordinating the legal activities of the president, including legislative initiatives, vetoes, etc.

It is already being speculated that the current function is only a "warm up" before taking over as head of the Chancellery, replacing Janusz Ziolkowski. The latter has been considering his resignation for some time (he has been on sick leave for the past few weeks).

A growing conflict was observed in the KRRiTV between Kwiatkowski, who was appointed to the council six months ago, and the council's head, Janusz Zaorski, also appointed by the president. Because they had initially formed a joint front against the remaining KRRiTV members, Zaorski eventually found it easier to cooperate with the other council members, while Kwiatkowski defended his old posts.

The conflict reached its climax when the KRRiTV sent a letter to the finance minister regarding funding for public television [TVP]. The document, very critical of the TVP, was signed by nearly all of the council members, from Marek Siwiec, of the Democratic Left Alliance, to Zaorski (only Jan Szafraniec abstained). Kwiatkowski, who was out of the country at the time, publicly distanced himself from the letter, claiming that the KRRiTV had traded TVP head Wieslaw Walendziak for the parliament's approval of its annual report.

Kwiatkowski, who did not hold Zaorski's skills in high esteem, had ambitions of becoming the head of the KRRiTV. He most probably passed on his reservations to Walesa at a meeting on Monday. The president, who is fond of the current KRRiTV head but did not want to lose Kwiatkowski, made a quick decision: Zaorski is to stay on the council, and Kwiatkowski will replace Falandysz in the Chancellery.

Kwiatkowski, 48, is a graduate of law at Warsaw University. He took part in the student protests of 1968. In the 1970's, he completed his training as a lawyer and judge. He had regular contacts with the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights. During martial law, he was involved in the underground printing movement, for example with the "Przedswit" publishing house.

In Mazowiecki's government, he was an adviser to Artur Balazs, minister without portfolio for the problems of rural areas. In 1991, he became the liquidator of IglooPol [large food-processing plant]. The Supreme Chamber of Control accused him of wrongdoing in the liquidation procedure, but the prosecutor's office dropped the charges against him.

From July to November 1991, he was also the liquidator of the Radio and Television Committee, which he left when Zaorski became its president. He then joined the Christian-National Union [ZChN].

In the election to KRRiTV held two years ago, Kwiatkowski was the Sejm's candidate, nominated by Peasant Accord and the ZChN.

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He then began working as a lawyer. He was the defendant of Andrzej Drzycimski [former presidential spokesman] in a libel case instituted by [head of the Center Accord] Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and of Jan Purzycki [former presidential media aide] in a case with Soroz [head of the private PolSat television network]. He also acted as Mieczyslaw Wachowski's plenipotentiary in proceedings against Kaczynski, when the latter accused the head of the president's Cabinet of being in a photograph taking during a Security Service training session.

Married for the second time. One child.

Article Berates Korwin-Mikke's Candidacy

WS1204123895 Warsaw GAZETA POLSKA in Polish 13 Apr 95 p 4

[Article by Rafal Broda: "The Dance Has Begun"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We are inaugurating a discussion on presidential candidates of the anticommunist camp. Being absolutely impartial, we will publish texts devoted to individual candidates; these texts will include both critical and laudatory articles, as well as analyses. This article by Rafal Broda about the candidacy of Korwin-Mikke is the first text we have received.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke has submitted his candidacy for president of the Polish Republic. I hope he will fail to collect the required number of signatures, and I believe he is aware of his chances, which are probably smaller than in 1990. Despite that, he took one more step to bury the right wing, and it is time to tell the entire truth right to his face, before the election campaign is in full swing.

I will begin by recalling a few facts that all of us should take into account while making up our minds about whom to support in the elections. These facts say a lot about Janusz Korwin-Mikke's political image.

- Korwin-Mikke has on numerous occasions and in writing expressed the view that he considers Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski a traitor. [passage omitted]
- Along with two other deputies of the Union for Real Politics [UPR], Korwin-Mikke abstained in the voting when the Olszewski cabinet was being overthrown. [passage omitted]
- Before the elections on 19 September 1993, when asked during a radio interview about his attitude toward the Vatican concordat, he replied unequivocally that "if I am elected a Sejm deputy, I will vote against the concordat...," and he gave some ridiculous reason about the necessity of double registration of marriages that would result from the concordat.
- Before the very same election, the campaign waged by Korwin-Mikke and most UPR journalists was directed against competitors on the right wing. The campaign against the Center Accord was simply outrageous. [passage omitted]
- Finally, a fact that many people might consider trifling. However, the observations that I have made compel me to consider this fact a significant sign that tells a lot about the role Korwin-Mikke is playing on the political scene. What I mean is his privileged access to media and the fact that he is very leniently treated by politicians of the progressive left wing. The left wing is right in assessing Korwin-Mikke's activities as not dangerous to them, or even as helping them survive. Korwin-Mikke returns these favors by appearing in GAZETA WYBORCZA, WPROST, POLITYKA, etc. [passage omitted]

I could list many more such facts. However, it is time for a more general recapitulation. I believe that the submission of the candidacy of Janusz Korwin-Mikke was an act that was detrimental to the right wing. I also want to state that, for a long time now, Korwin-Mikke has been trying to prevent the right wing from becoming a more significant force on the political scene. [passage omitted]

Deputy Industry Minister Edward Nowak Quits

WS1204135495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 12 Apr 95 p 6

[Article by Maciej Fischer: "Ministry of Industry; Deputy Minister Nowak Leaves and Levels Charges Against His Boss"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Deputy Minister of Industry Edward Nowak tendered his resignation yesterday and accused his superior of being incompetent. Minister Klemens Scierski claims that Nowak's revelations are a reaction to the fact that he has been dismissed.*

Nowak said yesterday in an interview with RMF Radio that he would submit his resignation because he did not agree with the style of work that had been observed in the ministry for the past few weeks.

"I do not agree to incompetence and lack of decisions here. I do not agree to undoing the work of recent years, especially from the period when Mr. Marek Pol was minister," Nowak said. According to him, the new minister has not done anything in the month since he assumed office. No decisions have been made, and the ministry is being ridiculed—jokes about it are already being heard.

Nowak did not comment on the decision of his new boss to set up an internal radio station in the ministry and to prepare special internal bulletins. Neither did Nowak comment on the idea of employees writing reports every day and having to report to work at 0815, whereas no one asks how late they have to work, what they are doing during this time, and how much money they receive.

Nowak stressed that previously the ministry had been kept away from politics, but the new minister (supported by the Polish Peasant Party—editor's note) is hiring people who are incompetent but who are affiliated with the party. Nowak defined himself as a man from "Solidarity"; Minister Pol also came from the opposition—he successfully kept politics out of the ministry's work (he

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was a member of the Union of Labor, but he suspended his membership for the period during which he held an office in government—editor's note).

Minister Scierski told journalists yesterday, before the Council of Ministers session, that as early as two days ago the prime minister signed the motion requesting the dismissal of Nowak from his post in the Industry Ministry. According to him, Nowak submitted his resignation yesterday, after he found out about it. The minister did not comment on his subordinate's charges of incompetence and undoing of the work done by Pol. He said only that it is Nowak's private opinion of his work. Scierski would not evaluate the work of his deputy minister. He said, however, that he has the right to select people who should work with him and that he has already done that. Government Press Spokesperson Aleksandra Jakubowska took the same stand yesterday.

NBP Postpones Date To Partially Float Zloty

WS1204141195 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Apr 95 p 16

[Article by Piotr Orlik: "A Free Zloty in May"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On 4 May, and not as originally planned by the National Bank of Poland [NBP] on 18 April, the zloty will be partially floated, we learned unofficially from the central bank yesterday, unless, obviously, unpredicted circumstances arise—for example, a protest to that decision by the minister of finance.*

After yesterday's meeting with representatives of commercial banks, the NBP decided to postpone the project for two more weeks in the hope that everyone will have ample time to prepare himself.

Over the past two days, NBP representatives elucidated the principles of the new system of setting currency exchange rates to bankers from commercial banks. It is to resemble that of the interbank exchange in Vienna (we wrote about this in GAZETA Nr. 82).

The banks will trade U.S. dollars and German marks for the whole day at exchange rates agreed upon earlier. Fixing—the setting of the interbank rate of the mark and the dollar—will be carried out each day at 1400. The NBP will intervene if necessary, thus having an influence on fixing results.

At the meeting with commercial bankers, NBP representatives promised that interventions would be in the range of $1-5 billion at a time, depending on the size of the bank.

Banks will then be able to sell and buy dollars from the NBP at the fixed price. That rate would be obligatory until the next fixing session.

At 1600 at the latest, the NBP will announce the official table of mean exchange rates on the basis of the fixed price and the exchange rates at the Frankfurt stock exchange. These tables will be the basis for, among other things, customs clearing.

Currently, the NBP establishes exchange rates on the basis of the mechanism of creeping devaluation of the zloty (1.2 percent monthly in the currency basket) and rates at the Frankfurt exchange. The greatest disadvantage of this system is that the NBP rates become effective only the next morning. The bank rates may differ from those of the NBP by plus or minus 2 percent.

Participants at the meeting with whom we spoke claim that changing the system of establishing the currency exchange rates is a prudent move. "In a market economy, it is normal that the rate of the zloty depends on the current situation on world stock exchanges and on the domestic currency market," said the director of the department of monetary policy at one of the banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. "We have to meet the challenge of the free market."

The bankers claim that the date the NBP suggested for launching the new system—18 April, right after Easter—is unrealistic. "There is too much to be done," said the head of currency operations from a major Warsaw-based bank.

The NBP has thus postponed the date of introducing the new system by at least two weeks. It will probably be launched after the May holidays, on 4 May.

The central bank is expecting trouble from the minister of finance. "To introduce the new system, the NBP president has to amend the regulation on exchange rates," a high-ranking NBP official told GAZETA WYBORCZA. "The Finance Ministry is currently expected to issue its opinion on the draft amendment. This could take three days or...three months."

NBP Chief Comments on Economic Developments

LD1304110595 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0615 GMT 13 Apr 95

[Interview with Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the Polish National Bank, by an unidentified Radio Zet announcer; place not given—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] Good morning.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Good morning.

[Announcer] Will the Polish National Bank [NBP] reduce interest rates?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] If conditions permit a reduction in interest rates, the NBP will not oppose it.

[Announcer] What are those conditions?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Primarily, we have to know the April rate of inflation. Fortunately, March was good, but it was just the first month where the inflation rate was

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just below the predicted one. On the other hand, January's inflation rate was higher than February's and also above the predicted rate of inflation. So, if we take December into consideration, the annual inflation rate in January and February grew from 29.6 percent to as much as 33.6 percent. We are glad that March was good and, if April also turns out to be good, I do not rule out freeing the zloty exchange rate.

[Announcer] So, if the reduction takes place, it will be in the middle of May.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] When we have the April results, I think. Any decision to reduce those rates earlier would not be a prudent one.

[Announcer] Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko is insisting that it should be done as soon as possible. Why and what is the difference between you and the deputy prime minister?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] As far as our methods are concerned, the differences are quite essential because we believe that society should be allowed to have relatively high interest rates for their savings, which, when kept in banks, prevent the influx of money onto the market. Otherwise, internal demand grows and this creates inflation. Thus, it gives an additional inflationary stimulus. On the other hand, Mr. Grzegorz Kolodko believes that this would not be dangerous, that there would not be such a large influx of money and that it does not create inflationary pressures. Without doubt, from the point of view of servicing the budget deficit, this would be [words indistinct], but we feel that, if we reduced them too early, inflation might be greater than predicted. And we still predict that it will be below 20 percent, and we will make every effort that this happens. So, I would say that the finance minister's proposal is a more risky one. The characteristic feature of the central bank is caution—not excessive, but caution is necessary.

[Announcer] But high interest rates hamper investment projects.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] You know, you cannot reconcile everything. I would say that, if the previous government controlled inflation more effectively, if the anti-inflationary package had come into force, and if the government were more concerned about these phenomena that are not on the monetary side but on the government's side, then obviously there would not be such a need to raise interest rates, and inflation would not be higher. Well, unfortunately these are the consequences of, I would say, the unappreciated inflationary tendency that still remains in the Polish economy. [passage omitted].

[Announcer] And when will the zloty exchange rate be freed?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The value of the zloty against the basket of currencies—we believe it will take place within several weeks. I would not like to give any specific dates. [passage omitted] We will do it when the time is right; we will not wait long. That is all I can say today. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Is the falling value of the dollar in the world to our advantage?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] There are pros and cons. Servicing our debt is cheaper for us, the dollar ceases to be something extraordinary for us; these are pros. On the other hand, for today, when the reserves are growing quickly, independent of the fall in the value of the dollar, this causes additional difficulties because what happens is that savings are changed from dollars into zlotys, which may be advantageous in the long-term but at this very moment creates additional pressures for the money supply. [passage omitted].

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'13,000 Metric Tons of Fuel per Day' Smuggled

AU1304095395 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 11 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Smugglers' Boats Are Equipped With Guns"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the Danube River straits, traffickers smuggle up to 13,000 metric tons of fuel per day over to the opposite bank of the river [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Considering the number of inhabitants in that area, this amounts to 400 liters a day per person. According to a correspondent of the AM-PRESS news agency, children aged 10 to 12 also participate in such extremely risky smuggling operations. The traffickers have improved their methods and taken protective measures. Each delivery consists of two boats loaded with fuel, accompanied by seven or eight other boats carrying no merchandise but rather armed individuals to guard the convoy.

All-Russian 'Consensus' Against NATO Expansion

AU1304092195 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 8 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Peter Stragher: "In Russia, There Is a Consensus Against NATO Integration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of NATO's Political Committee, led by the NATO secretary general and consisting of parliamentarians from the NATO member countries and members of the legislative forums from the NATO-associated countries—such as Romania—recently paid a visit to Russia. Present at this round of talks, which lasted for two days, Mr. Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party [PD], said that substantial talks were conducted with the Russian authorities from the Council of the Russian Federation, the State Duma, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even though they did not lead to good results. The conclusion of these broad discussions was that Russia is resolutely opposed to NATO's expansion and even succeeded in convincing the U.S. defense secretary to accede to Moscow's line. One day before the arrival of the delegation, the U.S. dignitary said that "the question of broadening the North Atlantic alliance does not arise."

The impression of the Romanian social-democratic leader is that, for the first time there is a consensus of all political forces in Russia—be they reformist or national-communist—on this subject. Russia's arguments against NATO's expansion—it even calls for NATO's dismantlement—are the following:

1. Since there are no longer antagonistic forces, NATO's existence can no longer be justified, particularly since Russia is no longer an enemy and is cooperating with the West; NATO is a military bloc and any military bloc is directed against somebody—hence, its expansion to the east would draw this military pact close to Russia's borders.

2. NATO's expansion toward the former members of the Warsaw Pact would upset the current balance in Europe and Russia sees itself threatened by such an eventuality.

3. From a political viewpoint, this political-military maneuver would further kindle Russian nationalism and extremism, something which might lead to an authoritarian regime's coming to power in Moscow.

This is the old tactic of Moscow threatening the West with the danger of the destruction of the democratic gains achieved thus far in order to justify the adoption of certain antidemocratic measures. The delegation members tried to explain to the hosts that NATO is not a body directed against anybody—despite the fact that Russia's traditional security policy maintains that any military treaty to which it does not belong is directed against it—and that NATO is on the point of changing its function, by primarily engaging itself in peacekeeping missions and supplying buffer troops. The delegation members also emphasized that in any case, Russia has privileged relations with the United States, and that it was offered a partnership in the alliance, thus excluding the theory that NATO might have bad designs on Russia.

Daily Informs on Army's Modernization Program

AU1204200795 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 6 Apr 95 p 2

[Article by Radu Tudor: "The Romanian Army's Modernization Program Will Cost Hundreds of Thousands of Lei"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Defense Council issued a decision on 4 April 1995 stating that the National Defense Ministry's modernization of its combat technology with a view to joining NATO is of very great importance.

According to the "Strategy for Outfitting the Romanian Army by the Years 2000-2010" several fields of action are envisaged. Here is a list of the major elements:

Weapons

—Introduction of the 5.56 caliber, Western standard, for automatic guns and rifles. The 40mm type will be introduced for grenade launchers.

—Antitank rockets: acquisition of METIS-2, CORNET, MILAN-2, and HOT-2 types of this weapon.

—Surface missile complexes will not be equipped with chemical or nuclear warheads, as has been the case so far.

—Artillery and missiles: import of OERLICO-type of complex batteries.

—Tanks: the type to be used in the future will be the Romanian TR-125 model, the manufacturing of which started in 1993. This tank will be modernized.

—TAB's [Armored Amphibious Carriers]: the one diesel engine model will be adopted for this means of transportation.

—Air Force: perfecting and modernizing the current fleet (supersonic fighters, subsonic fighter-bombers, and training aircraft).

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—Helicopters: IAR 330, PUMA, and IAR-216 B models to be modernized.

—Navy: It is equipped with the necessary combat weapons for these years.

—Transmission technology: in the process of unfolding the STAR program. The work to establish the first network started in March 1995.

—Computer technology: procured exclusively from imports.

—Laser technology: developing the positive results obtained by Romanian research.

—Radar technology: high power radar stations (locking on targets situated at a distance of up to 35,000 meters).

The Envisaged Costs

For Romania's military missions within the Partnership for Peace, 13 billion lei have been allotted for the year 1995.

The peacekeeping mission in Angola within UNAVEM III [UN Angola Verification Mission] requires funds of over $6 million from the Romanian state budget [approximately 12.6 billion lei]. This sum will be refunded by the United Nations at the end of the mission.

For the process of modernizing weapons through contracts with foreign firms, the estimate is over 100 billion lei.

The scrapping of military technology according to the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] also requires considerable sums; the amount is difficult to estimate for the time being.

The impending acquisition of military technology and Western communication technology is difficult to achieve because funds intended for this purpose would exceed the National Defense Ministry's budget.

The acquisition of high performance ammunition has been partially taken care of in the case of tanks but substantial financial allotments are still necessary.

In conclusion, the program of the Romanian Army's modernization is a -scope project. [sentence as published] Several hundred billion lei are necessary just for the first stage of this program. Through special directives of the state institutions this effort could be achieved.

Gheorghe Funar Adopts 'Anti-Hungarian Measures'

LD1204193995 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Gheorghe Funar has announced a whole series of additional anti-Hungarian measures. Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest:

[Bogdan] The nationalist mayor of Cluj-Napoca [Funar] is planning, among other things, to take the largest and most beautiful church in Cluj-Napoca, St. Michael Church, away from Hungarian believers and give it to the German community, since it was built by Saxon craftsmen. He also wants to take from local Hungarians Calvary Church in Monastery Road, which he says belongs to the Romanian Greek Catholics.

At the same time, he wishes to place an inscription in the Romanian and English languages on King Matthias's birthplace that explains that the greatest Hungarian king was Romanian. He also plans to add a new inscription to the Petoefi tablet on the facade of a house that will inform readers of the alleged anti-Romanian atrocities carried out by Hungarian revolutionaries in 1848 and 1849.

After the conflict created by the fuss around the King Matthias statue and the excavations in Main Square, Funar now wants to create new tension between the Hungarian and Romanian population.

Repatriate To Be Tried on Espionage Charges

AU1204140995 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 8-9 Apr p 8

[Article by Lidia Popeanga: "Traian Perlog Tried To Betray the Country by Transmitting Military and Political Secrets to a Foreign Secret Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Teodor Rus, spokesman of the Ministry of Justice, informed us that the file on the Traian Perlog case has been forwarded to the Alba Iulia Appeal Court. Perlog is to stand trial on charges of attempted treason by transmitting secrets.

In 1988, Traian Perlog left the country illegally and settled in Germany, where he continued to live until 1991. Within a relatively short time the defector became acquainted with a German citizen who introduced himself to Perlog as "Wolf," and requested that if Perlog ever returned to his home country, he transmit to Wolf any information on the country's defense capability and Romania's relations with its neighboring countries. After returning home, Perlog contacted Nicolae Pojan, a former police officer, from whom he requested information on certain companies in Sibiu, the new structure of the Ministry of Interior [MI] and the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], and secret MI orders, as well as information from the archives of the former Securitate.

Wolf also requested that Perlog obtain from Ovidiu Oprinescu—about whom he knew that he used to be a Securitate officer, after which he became head of the civil defense general staff of the Compa Ltd. company in Sibiu—military and political secrets. Besides this, Wolf also proved to be interested in any information on strategic military points, the location of military units and troops, the type of the missiles they used, or military products manufactured by a special unit in Marsa (Sibiu County.)

Using blackmail and threats, Traian Perlog also tried to obtain secret information from Doina Blejan, a former Securitate officer.

During the criminal investigations, the accused admitted his guilt completely. He is a graduate of the Topography School, a bachelor, and was unemployed before 23 February, the day he was placed under arrest.

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Mladic Denies Permit for Contact Group To Land

AU1204201295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Contact Group failed to arrive in Sarajevo because the Serb aggressor did not grant it the permit to land. Even though Karadzic had granted the permit earlier, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] asked war criminal General Ratko Mladic, knowing that he is the only one to have any say about it. Mladic refused the consent and pointed out that the civilian authorities of the so-called Srpska republic cannot decide on that, B-H Press has learned.

War criminal Mladic would have allowed the Contact Group members to land only with a helicopter, in which case they would have had to travel via Split and Kiseljak.

The Contact Group members realized that they would not have the time for such traveling and gave up their arrival in the capital city of Bosnia-Herzegovina today.

Karadzic's Serbs are still refusing any discussion with UNPROFOR about the opening of Sarajevo airport, and there are no chances of their giving guarantees for landing. On the contrary, they threatened to down any aircraft trying to land at the airport.

It is interesting to note that Karadzic's Serbs are not giving any reason for the ban and are in fact demanding amendments to the agreement on the airport that was signed with representatives of the legal Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and the United Nations.

It certainly does not say anywhere in these countless Security Council resolutions or the agreement on the airport that the Serb general and war criminal Ratko Mladic is a flight controller at Sarajevo airport. Both Yasushi Akashi and his UNPROFOR administration are well aware of that.

Mladic Letter Denies VRS Attacked Sarajevo

LD1204214695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2044 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 Apr (TANJUG)—Colonel General Ratko Mladic, commander of the general staff of the Srpska republic army [VRS], today sent UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] commander for former Bosnia-Herzegovina Gen. Rupert Smith a letter in which he rejected accusations against the VRS because of an alleged attack on civilians in Sarajevo on 9 April.

"I am extremely surprised that you have made unsubstantiated and unjustified accusations against the Serbs for this alleged attack without previously checking. I reject such accusations as false, tendentious, and not characteristic of our relations so far, as well as highly dangerous for mutual trust and the general peace process," said Gen. Mladic. He said it was incomprehensible that such serious allegations were made without any proof or previous analysis by experts.

"I wish to draw attention to the unacceptable nature of the accusations and threats contained in your report, which goes beyond the limits of usual correspondence and the mandate with which you have been entrusted," Mladic added in his letter.

"I must warn you that the threat of NATO air strikes is the expression of your bias against the Serbs and that it can force us to review our attitude to UNPROFOR in general. Do we need to remind you once again of the repeated and unjustified use of air power under UNPROFOR command against the Serbs in this war," asked Gen. Mladic.

The Serb commander goes on to ask: "Why have you not used the NATO air force or threatened to use it to prevent offensives by the Muslim army from the 'protected zone' of Tuzla on Mount Majevica [northeast Bosnia] and from central Bosnia on Mount Vlasic or to prevent a Croat offensive against the area of Grahovo and Glamoc [western Bosnia] in which the regular army of the state of Croatia is also involved?"

We wish to remind you that these unprovoked offensives have resulted in unprecedented sufferings and an exodus of the Serb civilian population. But you did not consider it necessary to go and see the degree of suffering and destruction or to tell important world bodies and international public about it, Gen. Mladic says in his letter.

In conclusion of his letter to Gen Smith, the VRS chief of general staff suggests that "if you genuinely want cooperation between the VRS and UNPROFOR to be correct, it would be both good and necessary if in future you first check the facts, weigh your words, and refrain from issuing threats."

Silajdzic Urges Change in International Attitude

LD1204194395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Unfortunately, we have some more bad news from Sarajevo. This afternoon a woman was wounded by a sniper firing from chetnik positions in Nedzarici. Snipers also hit Italian journalist Maurizio Cucci, who was driving on the town-airport route. The latest chetnik attack on Sarajevo has prompted us to ask Prime Minister Silajdzic, who addressed the European and world public via Eurovision today, for a statement.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Dr. Silajdzic, seven students wounded, but no reaction from NATO. General Smith promised a reaction yesterday.

[Silajdzic] You see, this has now become a regular pattern. The chetniks kill our people, then they withdraw. In the meantime NATO planes arrive and go back again. And it goes on like this day in, day out. People are being killed and wounded. It is true that there has been no reaction from NATO. However, as I have been pointing out over the last few days, until the international community changes its attitude to this issue, there

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will be no reaction. For as long as they expect the situation to either resolve itself of its own accord or to resolve itself so that the stronger wins because of their help, there will be no changes. We have witnessed over the last few days the same pattern in the cases of Gorazde and Sarajevo. They fire just enough shells to kill enough people but to escape NATO reaction. It appears that NATO has accepted to play this game.

[Correspondent] The Contact Group has not come to Sarajevo. The airport is closed and Sarajevo has been shelled again. Can these facts bring about changes in the attitude of the Contact Group, to make them do what they promised?

[Silajdzic] I doubt it. The Contact Group has nothing new to come up with. If they had come here they would have asked us to agree to extend the cease-fire, and you can see what this cease-fire is like. Perhaps we should hear what the Contact Group has to say and then ask them to deploy troops on the border between Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only this will [words indistinct], in other words, to deploy troops, that is what they can do. Another thing they can do is to ensure that the Contact Group plan is accepted by the UN Security Council, so that it becomes a resolution, a law, and by doing this give a signal to those who wish to change the border that the border will not be changed.

In my view, the whole case should be taken to the UN General Assembly, to a special session of the UN General Assembly. What is happening now is simply maintaining the status quo. If this is allowed to continue the problem will not be solved. The international community must radically change its attitude to this problem. [end recording]

Sarajevo Gas Pressure Falls as Supplies Reduced

AU1204174495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Natural gas pressure in the city fell considerably yesterday due to a reduction of gas from Ilidza. Due to this and despite the planned reduction, consumers' supplies in Centar and Stari Grad have been irregular. The situation is similar today, so the same difficulties may be expected by most consumers in Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo.

According to reports by [word indistinct] representatives, poor supplies in Sarajevo may last longer, as the quantities coming from the direction of Serbia have fallen, according to an announcement issued by the Sarajevo Gas Board.

Delic: Army Observing Cease-Fire Agreement

AU1304085195 Sarajevo DANI in Serbo-Croatian Apr 95 pp 7-11

[Interview with Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by Senad Pecanin and Vildana Selimbegovic; place and date not given—no headline as published]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [DANI] Commander Delic, would you first, please, tell us something about the current situation on the fronts in the republic.

[Delic] I constantly repeat that the cease-fire agreement has never been fully observed by the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor. The aggressor has never fulfilled the commitments taken on according to the agreement. To this I also add that the commitments taken on by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]. Despite me constantly pointing out that the offensive against Bihac has continued, particularly since 26 January, and that the decision of the General Staff of the so-called Yugoslav Army that anticipates such a possibility. Thus, units from the occupied part of Croatia, the occupied part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the so-called Yugoslavia, have been deployed in the Bihac region. However, it is known that the resistance by the 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be broken. Regarding that, I have warned both General Smith and Mr. Yasushi Akashi at all our meetings so far that they cannot demand that only we observe the agreement, without their fulfilling a single one of the commitments they undertook according to the agreement, which refers primarily to the Bihac region and clearly stipulates what is to be done by UNPROFOR and the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor. Nothing has been done regarding humanitarian routes, nothing has been done regarding the search for missing persons, medical evacuation.... All this has brought about an intensification of military activities on the part of the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor in the last 15 days. As it is stipulated by the agreement, we have kept silent in the media about the provocations, particularly in the protected areas, that are taking place on a daily basis. Those activities have already gone beyond provocations, because heavy artillery is being used. This is not happening only in Bihac or Tuzla, but also in Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde and particularly in Sarajevo, where civilians are being killed or wounded on a daily basis, not only by snipers, but also by mortar shells and other large-caliber weapons. Heavy artillery is being brought into the Sarajevo exclusion zone and tanks have been spotted—which has also been confirmed by UNPROFOR. However, all of a sudden, they have simply disappeared somewhere. UNPROFOR plays the old game—it does not see what it sees, it does not know what it knows. Sarajevo is being closed again, civilians are being killed, while what goes beyond any limits is the shelling of the Tuzla safe haven, with the well-known disastrous consequences. This has caused the intensification of the exchange of fire in the Tuzla region, so that we can push back their artillery position and prevent them from shelling Tuzla. Unfortunately, in the international public, our actions have been made equal to those carried out by the aggressor. It is being alleged that we have started an offensive. The Bosnian Army is still observing the agreement to the extent to which it is

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possible to observe it. I told this to Gen. Smith, demanding that, if he wants this agreement to last until its end, that is, 30 April, he should halt the attack against Bihac in the first place. Thereafter, a meeting of the central joint commission should be held in Bihac within the shortest possible time—I set a deadline of 48 hours—at which the implementation of Clause 9 of the agreement regarding the departure from Bihac of alien troops that came from the occupied regions in Croatia would be concretely agreed on. Then, the "blue road" via Sarajevo airport should be reopened. We have also demanded that a strong control should be established in order to protect civilians and citizens from sniper and other sorts of fire in the safe areas and that all the humanitarian routes should be reopened, because it is obvious that people are not killed only by bullets, they are also killed by famine. To a man, it is the same whether he will die from a bullet or from hunger. Then I have demanded that the same principle is applied in the case of the demilitarized zones. The Bosnian Army has pulled out from the demilitarized zone on Mount Igman, so we demand that the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor pulls out from Srebrenica, because his troops have broken into that demilitarized zone. UNPROFOR is doing nothing about it, while, in our case, it put pressure on us for more than a year until we complied. Those are the demands I have made to Gen. Smith, and I expect his reaction. If they are not fulfilled, the Bosnian Army will be forced to respond to the aggressor's provocations in the regions where civilians are endangered and to defend the free territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sarajevo Is a Political Decision

[DANI] It appears as though there is a slight confusion when speaking about the offensive actions by the Bosnian Army that are, perhaps, being carried out right now. It seems that there is a slight reserve and discomfort when talking about our successful offensive actions, both with the military and state leadership and with the media. As if we have not found the right model. Do you agree with this assessment?

[Delic] I would not say that we have not found the right model. When speaking about military actions that were carried out before the cease-fire came into force, we provided information only when those actions were completed. I think we had to prevent euphoria until things had definitely come to a close. For that reason, perhaps, it occasionally happened that some media reported on such actions earlier. However, in principle, I am against making certain things public until they are 100-percent sure, until we free a territory, until our engineer units fortify it adequately, until we fend off several counterattacks, until we remain in that territory for five or six days and establish our infrastructure. Only then can we say that we have liberated that territory. Because our experience in these past three years shows that we have often dispatched reports of our having freed a territory, and then we lost it again the next day. Our army is the legitimate armed force of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its offensive character originates from its role. Actually, it defends itself in several ways: Among other things, defense can have offensive character as well, because the legitimate presence of the Boanian Army on any territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina speaks for its defending that territory as well.... The point is that the Boanian Army wants, just as any other state organ, to observe the cease-fire until the end, because it has taken on the obligation. So far, we have not behaved as a partner who breaks his word. On the contrary, we endeavor to observe any agreement to the end if the other side shows a minimal will to cooperate. If such a will does not exist, then we are forced to defend what we have freed so far, what we have preserved. In that context, we should view the opinion that sometimes one should not be euphoric when a part of the territory is freed or defended, because it is a matter of an appraisal of what is more useful from the political or military point of view at the time.

[DANI] The aggressor is not showing any signs of readiness to accept the Contact Group peace plan. What will happen with Sarajevo in that context?

[Delic] Sarajevo is both a political and a military issue. Militarily, Sarajevo is further under the blockade than it was in the beginning of the war. True, now it is in a somewhat better situation regarding its defense forces, although the enemy aspires to occupy the city completely. However, the enemy had to give up its initial goals eventually. The Bosnian Army has grown into such a force that is capable of settling many problems regarding Sarajevo militarily. However, there is the political aspect to the issue, which is Sarajevo being a safe area. Sarajevo is under a NATO ultimatum. The exclusion zone exists. There is a string of such established world mechanisms that do not function when the defense of civilians is in question, when the opening of Sarajevo is in question, and when the conditions for a normal life are supposed to be created. However, when the Bosnian Army has to be prevented from taking any kind of action, all those mechanisms start functioning immediately. For instance, it is enough to say that bringing any heavy artillery into the 20-km exclusion zone may be reason enough for the international community or UNPROFOR to call NATO air strikes against our forces. They may interpret any kind of offensive activity in the exclusion zone as endangering what the international community has done to protect Sarajevo. That is to say, when considering the situation of Sarajevo, one has to keep in mind the other aspect as well—that there is not only a military decision regarding Sarajevo, but also a political decision: What is to be done with it? It is obvious that the international community, in addition to all the resolutions and ultimatums, has not done anything about Sarajevo except for the documents and the blockades that it has imposed on Bosnia-Herzegovina. I would not talk about the issue any

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further. It is obvious that the state organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina must have a strategy for settling the question of Sarajevo, while the United States is ready to do its part of the job.

Criteria for Ranks

[DANI] Recently, you have stated quite often in public that the cease-fire has been used in the best way to improve the readiness and competence of the Bosnian Army. What precisely do you have in mind?

[Delic] The Army has reorganized, and not only formally. Now we no longer have operations groups, but divisions and their command staffs, which is far more significant, because those staffs have all the functions that operations groups did not have: the logistic, normative-legal functions and so forth. Besides, the divisions are responsible for actions in corresponding operations directions, while their number is smaller than the number of operations groups. Thereby, we have made better command and management functions possible, and rearranged our brigades in terms of their positions on the front, the number of their troops, and their size to suit the needs in the different zones of responsibility. There are no interspaces blocking other units. The greatest task we have accomplished is the forming and training of detached units that do not have their own zones of responsibility and are not deployed directly on the frontlines. Thus, we can make possible the deployment of those units throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The speed of their deployment depends solely on the speed at which those units can reach the area in which they are supposed to carry out actions. They are barracks-based units, and they stand ready at all times. Thus, we have secured not only our maneuvering capacity, but also the capacity to strike more forcefully in any place we want. Such units have been organized at all levels, including the General Staff. Besides, a great job has been done regarding the training of the officer cadre, from the commanders of corps to those of platoons. We have carried out the training of commanders corps, division commanders, and commandants of all levels and profiles and the training of units. We endeavor to make our soldiers look as they would look in peacetime. Which means, starting from a neat appearance of the troops and the combat order of units in which the place of each soldier is known, to the General Staff, we have finally managed to complete the task for which we lacked time earlier, during the past three years. Of course, such things do not have an end, because one ought to go further, because the technology and conditions of warfare demand new solutions. And we are not satisfied with what we have achieved, so we are going further and already looking for new solutions. I think that, at the time of our next interview, you will have to ask me about some other structures in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because I am already scribbling and working on something new. [passage omitted]

[DANI] Commander Delic, your former deputy and current aide, Gen. Jovan Divjak, has stated publicly that, in his opinion, his knowledge and capabilities have not been used adequately....

[Delic] Of course he thinks that his knowledge has not been used adequately. He is given assignments according to his function. His earlier function as deputy commander is a duty that, in principle, is quite inadequately defined. What is the duty of any deputy commander? I can speak about deputy commanders in general—they do not have the right to manage affairs or command, they do not have concrete tasks, and they perform the duties that the commander entrusts them with. It sometimes happens that those officers, deputy commanders, even at lower levels, exceed their authorizations, so they want to be equal to their commanders, which is impossible. You know that we in the General Staff had two deputy commanders because of the national structure, rather than because it was necessary. We saw also in the example of Gen. Divjak, as well as with lower-ranking officers, that deputy commanders cannot be employed adequately, while if you give them too much authority they become equal to the commander, and we all know that dual authority and command cannot exist in the army. Therefore, we have abolished the functions of all deputy commanders. I think that in his current post Gen. Divjak is even more busy than he expected, and he cannot complain. I think that he was out of Sarajevo for almost two months, working on some tasks where his knowledge was used fully. Therefore, it can be said that, unfortunately, the nature of the function he used to perform, which applies not only to his function, but also to those of other deputy commanders, was to blame for his knowledge being, perhaps, used insufficiently. Seen objectively, Divjak is one of our most experienced officers and the most schooled officers in the Bosnian Army. [passage omitted]

[DANI] Can you tell us your opinion of the Zagreb Agreement, the relations with the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], the perspectives of those relations....?

[Delic] The goal of the talks with Gen. Bobetko in Zagreb was to discuss possible joint actions of Bosnian Army and HVO on one hand, and with the Croatian Army on the other hand, if it is forced to resume armed operations on the territory of Croatia. We also wanted to assess other modes of joint action, through informative-propaganda activities, logistical support.....

[DANI] You mentioned the territory of Croatia, did you not?

[Delic] Yes, I did. That means in the territory of Croatia, which would benefit the entire operative and strategic situation on the front in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to say, the goal of those talks was to link up our military activities. There is certainly an interest in that. In that case, we would have a cohesive force that would make possible our resistance to the Serbian-Montenegrin

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aggressor with far greater force than if the three formations acted individually. Of course, we also talked about how to use that force in the best possible way. We cannot meet and talk every day, because we all have our regular duties. Therefore, we considered the establishment of a body that would take on the commitment of preparing documents and similar things. Since we are talking here about several armies in one army, there is no coordinative or advisory body, and all we have is staff, command structures, and so forth. Of course, we thought that a joint staff should be established to perform such duties. I mentioned the joint staff, because it does not have a command function, which means that it can work on preparing and planning actions, while decisions will be made by those who are supposed to make decisions, namely by the Supreme Command in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which transfers certain rights in that respect to the General Staff. However, I, as the chief of the General Staff, do not have the right to make such political decisions, because those are decisions that can only be made by the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They can probably be discussed at the Assembly as well.... Nevertheless, the reports that Bobetko should be the chief, while we should be his deputies, are groundless, because the Bosnian Army, which rose from blood to be the great force it is today, is not willing to place itself under everybody's control, because it has its duties and tasks that are to be fulfilled toward this people and this state. How the question of the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Federation and possible confederation will be settled tomorrow, or what arrangements will be made in defense, I would rather not discuss right now, but it is certain that no army in the world can have two commanders, nor can the constitutional right and the legal right of the supreme command be changed just like that, at least when speaking about the Bosnian Army. Its supreme commander has been and will remain the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I would like to add something on the issue of ideologization, though: I have a high regard for all the members of the Presidency. Even after those events [reference to protest by five Presidency members against "misuse of religion" in Army], we still meet frequently and we still have normal relations, which means that we are not making the issue personal. It is actually about certain principles that we have to protect, and we have to spare the Bosnian Army from some political disagreements, the solutions of which should be sought where they can be found, and those are political and state institutions.

[DANI] To conclude, how do you assess the occasional and topical debates regarding the loss of the Bosnian Army's multiethnic character?

[Delic] I would like to see both the Serbs and the Croats participating in the Bosnian Army fully, like the Muslims do, but that is not a matter of the Bosnian Army, but rather of political organs and politicians; those who lead those peoples. In the beginning, there were far more Serbs. Gen. Divjak, Mr. Pejanovic, and other important representatives of the Serb people on the free territory have a chance to increase both the percentage and the number of Serb members in the Bosnian Army. I refer thereby to soldiers, and consequently to the command cadre. However, the situation is quite different. Those who have been instigating mistrust in the Serb people and encouraging deserters to run over to the occupied territory have had more success. As for the members of the Croat people, the party that aspires to represent the entire Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina wants all the Croats to be in the HVO. It is a duty of Mr. Komsic, member of the Presidency, to motivate as many Croats as possible in his native Kiseljak and elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina to join the Bosnian Army. Thereby its multiethnicity would increase. Finally, I would like to underline that those are not the only nationalities that we have in the Bosnian Army. I remind you that over 100 ethnic Albanians died in Sarajevo fighting for the Bosnian Army. They are to be paid full tribute for what they did. While reading an analysis yesterday, in one document alone I came across the names of two Macedonian officers who are in the Bosnian Army. The Bosnian Army is fighting for the rights of all the peoples on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The best proof of this is its actual behavior. We are the only ones who do not devastate churches and other temples. I was glad to see Cardinal Puljic in Zenica and Breza. I would also like to see Reis Ceric address the faithful at the mosques in Stolac, Prozor, or Banja Luka. I think this says enough for Bosnian Army.

Pejanovic, Tufan View Serb Position in Federation

AU1204171495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and chairman of the Serbian Civic Council [SGV], has received Sukru Tufan, Turkish ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tufan was particularly interested in the questions that were initiated at the second assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and defined by the declaration on peace and internal setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The questions pertain to the Serbs' position in the Bosniak-Croatian Federation and the SGV's participation in the peace process—that is, acceptance of the SGV as the legal representative on the part of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina who did not support the aggression (?before) the international community.

It has been agreed that a meeting between a SGV delegation and ambassadors of countries who are helping implement the Federation Constitution should be initiated in connection with the solving of the question of Serbs in the Federation.

Ambassador Tufan conveyed to Pejanovic the Turkish Government's invitation for a SGV delegation to visit Turkey. Pejanovic accepted the invitation, with a visit taking place possibly in May.

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'Santic Case' Slows Federation Progress

95BA0208G Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 23 Mar 95 p 4

[Article by S. Luckin: "Side by Side"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The disappearance of HVO [Croatian Defense Council] Major General Vlado Santic seemed to put a damper on all the euphoria with which the anniversary of the Federation's creation was celebrated for two days in Washington. For the moment, it caused food to stick in the throats of the guests invited to the ceremonial lunch with the U.S. Department of State organized on the occasion of the first birthday.

And while Kresimir Zubak and Dr. Ejup Ganic manifested the will of the two nationalities to live in a joint state before about 300 important guests at the ceremonial banquet, a letter was sent from the office of the prime minister of that state to the Croatian prime minister in which he informed him that the local authorities in western Herzegovina had instituted the posting of a mandatory deposit on all goods imported into or exported out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

And just a week earlier an agreement had been signed in Bonn to speed up implementation of the Federation's Constitution. The initials on that agreement had not even properly dried when Kresimir Zubak, one of the signatories, announced that it would be difficult for him to meet the agreed deadlines.

A few days ago, a similar assessment was expressed by Mirsad Ceman, general secretary of the SDA [Democratic Action Party]. He also believes that the deadlines are "tight," and he went on to explain that the dates for establishment of the various segments of authority within the federation resulted more from the pressure of the German Foreign Office than from the actual situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Exchange of Correspondence

Let us return briefly to the "Santic case." It was also an occasion for correspondence between the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] and the SDA. Dario Kordic, HDZ president, first reacted sharply, addressing a letter even to Alija Izetbegovic, but referring to him exclusively as president of the SDA. The response, again made public, was not long in coming. The SDA rejected any association whatsoever with the disappearance of the major general from Bihac.

The culmination of the correspondence was the announcement of the Presidential Council of Herceg-Bosna. In addition to seeking international arbitration in solving the "Santic case," against the case of a continued withholding of information, the council also took up the "possibility of possible countermeasures," the news release from Mostar stated.

So, not encouraging at all. The harsh words that the partners in Bosnia-Herzegovina exchanged hardly fitted into the efforts of international diplomacy to finally get the federation on its feet. After all, Warren Christopher, U.S. secretary of state, was announcing the newly established group "Friends of the Federation" along with the $30 million that his country will appropriate for the Federation. Those friends are also to become involved in financing the partnership between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

Everything we have written up to now is unfortunately the way it is in the Federation a year after its birth. When in March of last year Tudjman and Izetbegovic were putting their signatures to the Washington Agreement, people could not or did not want to see, given the excessive euphoria at the time, that those who had been adversaries until the day before sat down at the same table mainly because of the pressure from the United States. Except that the contented smile of Bill Clinton strongly suggested that conclusion.

Later, whenever a crisis occurred in relations between the partners, that "international factor" always came to the rescue. Incidentally, one need only recall that all agreements of any significance between the leaders of the two nationalities were concluded outside the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. First there was Washington, then Vienna, Brussels, Zagreb, all the way to Bonn and back to Washington.

To be sure, there have also been some significant results in this year that the federation has existed. The most essential thing is that there have no longer been conflicts between the "two nationalities that had never warred with one another," as many deputies declaimed in the first meeting of the Constitutional Assembly. Nor is it unimportant that one can travel from Doljani to Tuzla, that goods are traveling on the roads, that people are living better....

But the barricades are still standing at the crossings from territories controlled by the HVO to areas of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Permits are required for people to cross from one free part of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the other. Within those areas separated by barricades, there are always two different systems of government—the one called "Herceg-Bosna" and the legal, internationally recognized one of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mirror

Of course, this is also a mirror of the federation today, just as it is a fact that its president, Kresimir Zubak, spends more time performing the duties of his office as president of "Herceg-Bosna" than he spends in Sarajevo, which is where his office is officially located. And it is also a fact that there are few people in Bosnia-Herzegovina who are clear about when the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, made up of the same ministers, is acting as the republic government and when it is acting as the Federal Government.

One thing this past year was spent on was creation of three cantons, but there are supposed to be eight of them

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in the federation. As a matter of arithmetic, not even half of the job has been done. Other projects that in toto were supposed to constitute the federation have also come to a halt somewhere in the middle. It is sufficient to recall that we have waited for half a year now for creation of the federal police and customs service. In principle, both sides are in favor of creating them, but at Doljani in particular police are still standing at the crossing with the insignia of "Herceg-Bosna" on their shoulder. The height of these absurdities, although from the political standpoint it seems the least important, is that the athletes on both sides of the barricade cannot get together on the same team to represent Bosnia-Herzegovina in international competition. And the rule for athletes is the joint state in which Croats and Bosnian Muslims live side by side.

But that is also the federation. Today, its officials are saying that the joint state of Bosnian Muslims and Croats is on an ascending trajectory. But as a rule assessments of that kind have been uttered after every meeting held under the sponsorship of international diplomacy.

General Delic Anticipates Direction of War

95BA0208H Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 23 Mar 95 pp 6-7

[Interview with Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Emir Habul and Sefko Hodzic; place and date not given: "War Is More Certain Than Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The occasion for the interview were the controversies following the Zagreb meeting and the dilemma as to whether a joint command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Army [HV], and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] had been created. We asked General Delic what actually was the result of the Zagreb meeting?*

[Delic] In seeking solutions that could unify military activities in that body, we said that in principle this could be a combined staff with powers similar to those of the Combined Staff Headquarters of the Army and the HVO. Which means that this is not a command (neither headquarters nor authority). After all, a headquarters or authority has the right to make decisions, while a combined staff does not have the right to make decisions. This is simply, as it is put in civilian life, a coordinating body that from one or more places would issue recommendations for coordination of particular activities, but the right to make decisions would remain within the structures of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HV, and the HVO. This means, first, that nothing has been signed, and second, it could not be verified.

As for the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, political verification can be given only by the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Supreme Command. The coordinating body, that combined staff, would have neither superior nor subordinate. This is a joint approach in which activities would be agreed upon on the basis of interests, whether it is a question of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Croatian Army. Whether there will exist a joint body that would facilitate only the performance of those activities, that is a question of policy. But in principle it does not prevent activities from continuing to be performed.

Strategic Importance

[OSLOBODJENJE] What does this form of coordination mean at the strategic level?

[Delic] At the strategic level, it means a great deal. If the military potential of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or the federation, and the Republic of Croatia are used according to a plan that will be coordinated, then this will yield large results because that planning is done in terms of time, objectives, and capabilities. Joint results are much better utilized than when units are used in combat operations individually at different times and different places. So, it is a question of creating a more condensed mass that can oppose more successfully the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor than has been the case up to now.

[OSLOBODJENJE] It seems that both the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim peoples have welcomed this agreement. I heard that people in Zagreb did not conceal this when you strolled through Zagreb following these talks.

[Delic] People, ordinary citizens, always want to hear something nice and good—something that offers prospects and yields a reasonable solution. And we are talking about a rational solution that should have been relevant before now. It should have been relevant in 1992, at the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or perhaps even earlier....

Ready To Fight

[OSLOBODJENJE] Military analysts have been assessing the continuation of the war. What is your forecast: Will the Balkans ignite, as Western observers fear, or will all-out war be waged in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as General Spegelj forecast?

[Delic] We can say from this present perspective that the likelihood that the war will continue is high. Higher than the possibility that after this truce, which is not being honored anyway, there will be a just solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and indeed for Croatia as well. That is why it is realistic to expect that the war will continue. We are prepared for that. It is difficult to judge what dimensions it will have. I think that those who talk about the spread of the war at the Balkan level are exaggerating. As a soldier, I would like to have that happen, because that would make it easier for the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor would be stretched out and would no longer be able to anticipate that new supplies of armament and men would be advanced from Serbia and Montenegro

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when needed. But I think that the top Serbian-Montenegrin leadership will avoid a spread of the war to other areas because of their own capabilities. After all, they have already been doing this partially: first Slovenia, then Croatia, then Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then a truce in Croatia in order to spread the war in Bosnia. Now, perhaps it wants the opposite—a respite in Bosnia in order to finish the job in Croatia. That is, it is not in their interest to expand military combat operations. It is certain that Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to be the area in which most of that will be happening—both because of the combat operations that the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor is initiating at this very moment, and also because of the combat capabilities of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its coordinated action with the HVO. At the same time, the supply line to the Krajina Serbs runs across the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue to be affected by military operations. After all, peace solutions have been offered, solutions that we accepted even though they were defective and unacceptable to the bodies of government and the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the other side did not accept them. Without a political solution, there can be no talk about peace on the space of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and indeed more broadly. We continue to be ready, mainly as the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina, its statehood, and the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Training in the Intermission

[OSLOBODJENJE] Recently, you have said quite a bit about building the Army. What are the features of this qualitative leap?

[Delic] During these three years, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has grown numerically. It began, as the president has said several times, at somewhere around 17,000, then it grew to 50,000, then 100,000, and then 200,000 men. However, as for qualitative strengthening, there has been little room for creating internal cohesion in the units, for creating an uninterrupted system of command, for drilling and training soldiers, units, and commands. This intermission between the signing of this agreement on cessation of hostilities on 31 December to the present has been used to the maximum, above all for the training, drilling and internal restructuring of units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both individuals and units have gone through training, especially officers, from squad commanders to division commanders. So, we should say that we have completed that transformation; in addition, the General Staff has earned its name in more than symbolic fashion in this process of transformation. The obligations and tasks, the rights and the powers, of that supreme body of command and control have been properly defined. Between the corps and the brigade we have introduced the new institution, a new command, the command of the division as the operational-tactical unit whose task is to unify combat operations along operational axes. This is a new qualitative aspect in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have created a large number of maneuverable brigades that do not have their zone of responsibility, nor line of combat contact, but are ready under garrison conditions to perform a mission in any part of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Enemy's Objectives

[OSLOBODJENJE] The past year has also been characterized by the tactical successes of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is the Army ready now to carry out even more complicated operational missions?

[Delic] It is certain that our task has been to fit the Army for even more complicated tactical and operational actions. The units and commands of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are capable of performing those missions. I would mention once again that we have been training commands at all levels, beginning with corps commands and up through division commands, and that process is still going on, and through it we are fitting them for far more complicated missions than those they have been performing up to now. However, other conditions are also necessary for certain more significant operations. The question is how much backing will we get concerning matters that are in the jurisdiction of the state authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Issues include, for instance, the question of logistical support with sufficient quantities of materiel, food, and fuel; how much backing we will get in resolving the problem of fighting men; to what extent will the state and state agencies take on life as functional entities; how willing will they be to support that fight; and how much support will come from international factors? You know, as soon as you undertake certain activities, certain international factors immediately appear and call for a truce, cessation of offensive combat action, so that there are a number of factors here that are outside the jurisdiction of this kind of capability of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that is a labyrinth, but, in any case, compared to the time when this truce was established, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has become fit for far more complex tasks than it had been up to that time.

[OSLOBODJENJE] Some people believe that the chetniks will not consent to peace until they lose all hope that they can defeat us. Therefore, what is the balance of power now on the battlefield in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Delic] I think it is clear to them that they can no longer defeat us. If they had that hope, they should have lost it, and I think that they no longer have illusions in that regard. The problem is how to hold on to what they have occupied. I think this is the problem that most bothers them, along with certain corrections that they would like to achieve in the field. Even the official military analysts no longer pose the question of whether it is possible for the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be defeated. The question now is the capability of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to accomplish that turnaround we spoke about earlier and whether the world will allow

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it anyway, because the international community still desires above all to maintain the status quo on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For that reason, concerning the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor, I can say that they still have strength, above all in the matter of equipment. The human factor, at least on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is to our advantage. I am not talking only about numbers, but also about morale, about the fitness of units, and indeed even about the internal organization of units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is certain that the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor will continue to have certain targets or certain objectives and will operate offensively in certain areas. Aside from Bihac, this would above all be the area of eastern Bosnia. Even though the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and the international community have certain obligations, it will attempt to always keep a stone around our neck in that area, as a counterbalance against our possible offensive activities. They certainly will continue to put pressure on Sarajevo regardless of all those many ultimatums imposed both by NATO and the international community, and also the possibility of correction in the Brcko corridor, which still is not wide enough for them.

The Corps With the Most Officers

[OSLOBODJENJE] Bihac and the 5th Corps are a great mystery for the world. When you go outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, they probably ask you the question of how much the defense can take and how that corps has the strength to resist such pressure from the offensive that has lasted for months?

[Delic] It should be said that the 5th Corps is organized according to all the military principles of an up-to-date army. The fortunate thing in formation of the 5th Corps was the large number of officers who were in that area. That is the corps that has the most officers who have graduated from military schools, which from the beginning created the conditions for them to achieve very good organization. At the same time, there is the mentality of that Krajina man. The Krajina men have always been good fighters. That is something that is generally known. It is certainly fortunate that they had the time, above all in 1992 and 1993, to go through training to achieve the fitness of all units and commands in that area. But still the strength lies in those people. The strength lies in their system of organization and command and performance of missions.... Although physically separated from us, and this is characteristic, they perform all missions assigned them by the General Staff. After all, we still have a far larger number of specialized personnel. They can analyze the situation more professionally and comprehensively. They are fully carrying out all suggestions and tasks that we make in those areas. One thing is certain—we do not allow them to remain alone. Especially when there was that autumn offensive against the areas of the 5th Corps. We engaged our forces all over the remainder of the theater, so that we attracted strong forces of the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor against the territories of other corps. It is certain that we would also do this in the future. We need not publish this in the media, but, when necessary, the 5th Corps will be aided, and it is natural for it to be aided. That approach to the fighting is normal, and their method of planning and executing combat actions is distinct from others. They rarely use a conventional defense. They are offensive in defense. Thus, we are sometimes accused of operating offensively in that area. It is natural that defense can be passive and active. The 5th Corps has selected active defense, and that has proven to be good.

[OSLOBODJENJE] What was the role of Santic and the HVO in the defense of Bihac?

[Delic] That role had little significance from the military standpoint, for several reasons. First, the Croatian population is small in the Bihac region. By and large, the unit they formed is insignificant compared to the enemy's objectives against the entire strength of the 5th Corps. What is more, the 5th Corps was unable to influence the military formation and strengthening of the internal organization of the HVO. Several times we had cases when they left the front line on their own. From the beginning of the war until the autumn offensive, the 5th Corps was unable to exert its qualitative military influence on the HVO. Because they are also without physical influence from the General Staff of the HVO, I think that their military organization is also insufficient. That was proven in the fall, when most of the combat actions were directed against the Croatian villages, which are south and southwest of Bihac. So Bihac was threatened from that direction. Almost all the Croatian villages were occupied and torched. It was only through commitment of units of the 5th Corps that that area was liberated once again; the HVO naturally did cooperate, but I say once again that this is a small unit that cannot have any essential impact in changing the situation on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the political importance of joint action is very great. This is a relationship between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. And from that standpoint that relationship must be nurtured, because this is one part of a relationship that has an influence on the entirety of relations between the Bosnian Muslims and Croatian peoples.

Religion Does Not Determine Status

[OSLOBODJENJE] The General Staff has become involved in a debate about ideologization and introduction of religion into the Army.

[Delic] I think that the issue of ideologization of the Army was mistakenly posed at that time, and that is why the General Staff reacted. As a matter of principle, we do not react to such things. But in all armies of the world that claim to be democratic, religion is allowed. After all, this is a free choice of the individual. At the level of units, higher tactical units, in many armies there are not only institutions where religion can be practiced, but there are even religious officials. Why should that not be

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allowed in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well? I think that we were right in doing that. We also have officers who are specialists and help in free expression of faith. That is in their job description. No one is forced to practice a religion, no one can be forced to be a believer, nor does a believer or atheist have a special position. A man's position is determined according to his human and fighting qualities. So there is no question of ideologization. In these times of war, religion always has a greater number of followers; people go back to religion, they go back to their roots. I would say that this people of ours is also seeking its spiritual roots in religion. They find additional motives in this struggle in their religious commitments. And it is very important to us that a man be motivated in that way to take part in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[OSLOBODJENJE] Has anything changed in relations with the UNPROFOR since the departure of Rose and the arrival of Smith?

[Delic] These are fundamental relations. I am not satisfied until they fulfill their obligations, regardless of the person who heads the force. Accordingly, I will talk to General Smith the same way I talked to General Rose. If they fulfill their obligations, then those relations will be correct. If they do not fulfill their obligations, then personal relations will be correct, but official relations will be faithful to principles.

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Tudjman Receives Contact Group Representatives

LD1204133895 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Several minutes ago we received the following statement from the office of the president of the republic:

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman received in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb today representatives of the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina, diplomats from the United States, Russia, France, Germany, and the European Union. On our side, the meeting was also attended by Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Miomir Zuzul, the president's special envoy and ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Croatian Ambassador in Bonn Ivan Ilic, and Gordan Radin, head of the president's office.

The Contact Group representatives informed the president about the work of the Contact Group for Bosnia-Herzegovina and their talks in Belgrade with Serbian President Milosevic. They also informed President Tudjman that they are unable to go to Sarajevo today for talks with Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, due to the closure of Sarajevo airport.

The Contact Group representatives sought from President Tudjman his opinion on issues they are attempting to resolve.

Charges of Racism Toward UN Members Denied

LD1204163095 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] While we have been on the air the Croatian Foreign Ministry has issued the following statement:

The Republic of Croatia protests most vehemently against accusations that it has displayed racism and chauvinism vis-a-vis members of the UN forces from Asia and Africa, serving as part of the UN operation to restore confidence in Croatia—UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia]—which over the last few days have appeared in agency reports and newspaper articles. In these articles Croatia's President Dr. Franjo Tudjman and other high-ranking officials are reported to have made claims about the alleged incompetence, ignorance, and inferior abilities of Asian and African members of the UN forces serving on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, as compared with European and American members. Some articles go as far as to claim that the Republic of Croatia will officially ask the UN to send exclusively white members to serve as part of the UNCRO operation.

The Republic of Croatia denies that it has ever, officially or unofficially, refused to welcome Asian and African members of the UN forces on its territory. The only criticism that the Croatian authorities have ever had against the UN in the Republic of Croatia, and which they have consistently drawn attention to, is with regard to the general ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] as a whole, and its inability to carry out tasks set under its mandate and in line with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This criticism has often been repeated in the Croatian Assembly, by the president of the Republic of Croatia, and the Croatian public. This eventually resulted in the decision to cancel UNPROFOR's mandate in the Republic of Croatia from 31 March 1995 and to establish a new and separate UN operation in the Republic of Croatia under UN Security Council Resolution 981.

On the other hand, the Republic of Croatia has repeatedly expressed its desire for maximum involvement by NATO and other European security organizations in the efforts to resolve the crisis on its territory. This desire is based exclusively on the need for Europe to play a leading role in resolving the crisis, its regional responsibilities, and on the fact that it has the means to effectively support the reintegration of the occupied Croatian territories, this being the primary goal of Croatia's foreign and domestic policy as reiterated in the UN secretary general's reports.

This position has never been based on either racist or the national characteristics of any member of the UN mission in the Republic of Croatia, and is in no way designed to insult or denigrate the valuable efforts which non-European UN members have made in helping to restore peace in the Republic of Croatia.

The Republic of Croatia wishes to repeat that there is no evidence of racism in either its state policy or among the Croatian people. This can be validated by many officials of UNPROFOR and other international organizations operating on the territory of Croatia, who have always been treated as dear guests to whom the Croatian state has always given help so that they can carry out their duties.

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Crvenkovski, Kinkel Hold News Conference 11 Apr

AU1204155495 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 12 Apr 95 p 5

[Report by G. Mihajlovski on news conference by FYROM Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in Skopje on 11 April: "The Moment for a Turning Point"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I have a feeling that now is the time for progress on the Greek blockade," said German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel at yesterday's joint news conference with Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski. Kinkel twice emphasized this sentence and made an appeal to both sides "to make an attempt to have the blockade lifted."

Stressing that at this moment he "would not like to create false expectations or euphoria because it is a sensitive matter," and referring to his talks with Gligorov and Crvenkovski, as well as Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias and Deputy Minister (Manghakkis), whom he had met in Luxembourg two days earlier, Kinkel said that his impression was that the "Greek and Macedonian sides are considering conditions for starting negotiations under the aegis of Cyrus Vance."

Kinkel said that the "resolution of the conflict between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Greece is necessary for the stable development of Macedonia and also for stability in the region."

Kinkel recalled his six-point program from when he chaired the EU, which consisted of the matters of the country's name, flag, and Constitution, the embargo, an agreement on good neighborly relations between Greece and Macedonia, and intensive economic assistance for Macedonia, including assistance from Greece. Asked if he had brought any new proposals to Skopje on resolving the Greek-Macedonian dispute, he replied: "I would not like to be quoted now as having any new proposals in the sense of a 'deus ex machina,' or with a homespun solution to solve today all the problems of tomorrow."

Regarding the Greek embargo, Kinkel said that they "demonstrate solidarity with their partner Greece, but all the other 14 members of the EU agree that the economic embargo imposed on Macedonia is wrong." Asked about possible dialogue leading to an agreement between Macedonia and the EU, he said that this could only happen after "Greece renounces its opposing attitude." Kinkel said several times that the road to stable political and economic development must be opened, emphasizing that Germany supported this, and then he pointed out: "Macedonia has always known that it can have confidence in us, and I hope that this will continue to be the case."

Crvenkovski stressed the support that had come for the Republic of Macedonia from Germany at key moments. He "expressed great satisfaction" with Kinkel's visit because it is "a very important step for relations between Macedonia and Germany, which have been developing intensively in the recent period."

Kinkel said that "this country needs economic progress and Germany wishes to continue its bilateral assistance within its capabilities." He also announced that an agreement will soon be reached on cultural cooperation between the two countries—an agreement which, because of the problem of the name, will be made through an exchange of verbal notes.

Asked whether he had discussed with Gligorov and Crvenkovski the inclusion of German military forces in the UN peacekeeping mission, Kinkel replied: "There has not been a concrete request as yet, so we have not had the need or opportunity to make such a response. If there is such a request, we shall consider it with great care."

[Box, p 5] The Matter of the Name Is Ridiculous

Government Spokesman Gjuner Ismail also held a news conference. Most of the questions raised by German journalists were related to the Greek-Macedonian dispute. Here are some responses by Ismail:

[Unidentified correspondent] What about the name and Macedonia's willingness to accept a compromise?

[Ismail] We are not willing to accept a compromise in relation to the name, and if the situation had not been so complicated, the whole question of the name would have been ridiculous. It would never occur to Macedonia to tell anybody what he should call himself.

[Unidentified correspondent] What about changes in the Constitution?

[Ismail] We are ready to present our views and explain our understanding of good-neighborly relations. If there are things and articles in the Constitution that our neighbors do not understand, we are ready to explain them.

[Question] Tell us about the terms of the negotiations.

[Ismail] There are conditions called civilized conditions for discussions. It is impossible to hold discussions under the shadow of an embargo.

[Box, p 5] Progress With Greece Is Essential

Kinkel's one-day visit to the Republic of Macedonia came at the invitation of Macedonian Foreign Minister Crvenkovski.

In addition to the meeting with his host Crvenkovski, Kinkel also met President Kiro Gligorov, [Assembly] Chairman Stojan Andov, and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski.

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"The visit of the German minister to the Republic of Macedonia represents a new impetus for the development of overall cooperation between the two countries," the Office of the President stated after the meeting between Gligorov and Kinkel.

The joint assessment was that the two countries have developed friendly relations and cooperation. President Gligorov particularly stressed the importance of the economic and political support that Germany is rendering Macedonia.

It was also agreed that it is very important to find a way to make progress in negotiations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece.

The Office of the Assembly Chairman stated that there had been an exchange of views on the current political situation in the Republic of Macedonia and on relations with neighbors in general. The joint assessment was that the cooperation between the Bundestag and the Assembly must be further developed, as well as the cooperation between the liberal parties of the two countries.

There has been no official statement from Prime Minister Crvenkovski's office.

Kinkel also held afternoon discussions in the Assembly with representatives of the opposition parties that are not in the Assembly, as well as with representatives of the ethnic Albanian political parties.

'Crafty' Greek Plan Seeks To Blame Skopje

AU1204200895 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 12 Apr 95 p 4

[Report by Gj. Risteski: "Greece Is Violating UN Sanctions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The affair with the large illegal shipment of equipment involving Iranian oil for eastern Slavonija that was recently seized in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is slowly becoming clear. However, it seems that the beginning and the end of the affair lies in the hands of our southern neighbor, which managed to obscure the whole business in the hope of doubling its profit from the whole affair. The finncial profit would come from the money for the organization of the shipment and the political profit from accusing Macedonia of violating the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Fortunately, our customs officers came to the rescue by seizing the trucks from Bulgaria at their immediate entry into Macedonia.

According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, Canadian equipment for oil prospecting, produced by "Triton International" and owned by a Serbian emigre, Vladimir Katic, was unloaded on 20 February. In agreeing to this deal, the Greeks had thought of everything except for its discovery on our border.

Customs Story

Namely, they had loaded up the goods and shipped them to Bulgaria as exports from Greece to Bulgaria. The name of a Bulgarian enterprise was used in the documents, and the goods were thus made Bulgarian, after which new documents presented them as a Bulgarian shipment for export to Macedonia. The moment they arrived at our border, however, customs officers seized all the equipment, which was being carried on 13 trucks (previously it was claimed that hundreds of trucks were involved, of which around 60 were already in Macedonia), and it was then unloaded in Gevgelija.

Our customs officers had been previously tipped off about this smuggling channel, and so the goods were seized. This was clever of them, because if they had asked for the goods to be declared for customs inspection, the importer would have come and demanded they be exported; in that case the route would have been discovered—that is, the one that is violating the sanctions. This might have caused other consequences, too.

It was clever to seize the equipment because in the meantime the Greeks' crafty and evil "good-neighborly" plan had been activated. When the Greeks had loaded the equipment onto the trucks and had made sure that it had left Bulgaria and was heading for Macedonia, they contacted the United States and accused Macedonia of violating the embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In doing this, they expected a double profit: To take the money for the service, and score political points as protectors of the embargo, while accusing Macedonia of violating it. They would use this to justify their embargo against Macedonia: Look, we are blockading Macedonia because it is violating the embargo. This might have seriously affected Macedonian-Greek negotiations, through which the United States is insisting on finding a just solution that will satisfy both sides.

Macedonia: Clean

However, the Americans "are no fools," and as soon as they were informed about the kind of equipment involved, they alerted their offices and realized what the whole business was about.

We have heard unofficially that the whole mess was caused by Greece and some Serbs from eastern Slavonija, while neither Bulgaria nor Macedonia were involved—in spite of THE NEW YORK TIMES claims that four Balkan states were involved. Actually, Dimitar Belcev, undersecretary in the Macedonian Foreign Ministry, told us the following:

"The ministry had not been informed of such a shipment, and it was not involved in it because it is a completely different economic matter. If such equipment has been seized, it is a matter for the Macedonian Customs Office, and they are are in charge of the legal procedures."

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Government Spokesman Gjuner Ismail expressed a similar opinion in his talks with journalists on the visit of the German foreign minister when asked by a German journalist about sanctions-busting:

"Macedonia has traffic links with Yugoslavia and the whole 'north-south' axis and we allow goods to be shipped through Macedonia. Those goods are then unloaded in Salonika. This is an international commitment. However, Macedonia has clearly stated that it will be strict in applying the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. We cannot be sure about the attitude of others."

It may soon be proven who is attempting to violate the sanctions, but by seizing the oil equipment (our customs officers are still trying to work out what kind of equipment it is) it has become difficult for the Security Council to talk in terms of Macedonia's violating the sanctions. Other authorities will have to establish whether Greece is guilty of this. Nevertheless, knowing the Greek policy and lobbying, we can expect that Greece will most probably be pardoned for this, too.

Minister Views Current Economic Situation

AU1204180195 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 29 Mar 95 p 23

[Interview with FYROM Economics Minister Risto Ivanov by B. Stipic; place and date not given: "Bulgaria Is Our Access to the World"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] minister of industry, trade, prices, energy, tourism, standardization, and inspections—the economics minister—is a young, but not inexperienced Macedonian politician. Risto Ivanov began his career as a youth organization official before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, became part of the Macedonian Government as deputy president for the political system on 14 July 1993, and has been economics minister since 25 December 1994. The Macedonian public considers him a very good politician—which, considering the situation the Macedonian economy is in, is an important plus.

[Stipic] Could you introduce the Macedonian economy to us in figures?

[Ivanov] Last year GDP fell by 7 percent and industrial output by 11.4 percent. We were planning for 70-percent inflation but it was actually 54 percent. We have had a fixed exchange rate for the national currency for the entire year, the value being the same against the German mark—but against the U.S. dollar it has increased by 11 percent. The exchange rate is fixed on the currency markets rather than by decrees.

[Stipic] What measures do the Macedonian Government and the central bank use to maintain this exchange rate?

[Ivanov] We are controlling the money supply; selective loans have been abolished; and compulsory bank reserves have been determined, changing each month, depending on bank deposits and the quantity of money in circulation. The currency reserves are determined according to how much money the banks have in their accounts.

[Stipic] What are Macedonia's currency reserves?

[Ivanov] On 31 January 1994 they stood at $128 million. We are expecting them to increase to $169 million by the end of this year. In 1994 they increased by $20 million.

[Stipic] We hear that, at the same time, unemployment is increasing.

[Ivanov] That is correct. There are over 180,000 unemployed at present. On 31 December 1994 there were 391,000 employed, which was 30,000 fewer than at the beginning of 1994. It is expected that this year about 20,000 more workers will lose their jobs as a result of government reforms. Last year the trade deficit was $290 million and the balance of payments deficit was about $45 million. The greatest falls in production were in manufacturing, construction, and trade, while in agriculture and the service sector it remained at the same level or slightly increased. In comparison with 1989, the fall in the physical level of production was about 50 percent in 1994. This year we are anticipating a 0.8 percent increase in GDP, 0.7 of which should be in the economy—that is, industry—and 1.5 percent in agriculture. Inflation is forecast at 17.8 percent and we also plan to maintain the exchange rate of 27 denars to the German mark until the end of the year.

[Stipic] When did you introduce the denar as your currency?

[Ivanov] On 26 April 1992.

[Stipic] What was the exchange rate then?

[Ivanov] It was 21 or 22 denars—but in the meantime we have removed some zeros, so we cannot compare it. When the denar was introduced, annual inflation stood at 2,200 percent and monthly inflation at about 27 percent. By 1994 we had 55 percent annual inflation, and this year we forecast 17.8 percent. The budget deficit in 1993 was 11 percent of GDP and in 1994 this fell to 2.9 percent. The deficit planned for this year is 1.4 percent.

[Stipic] The falls in production and employment do not sound too promising. What measures does the government intend to take?

[Ivanov] We have three big projects for this year. The first is privatization. By the end of the year between 700 and 900 companies should have been privatized. There are 25,000 companies in all, but there are many small, private ones. However, all the companies included in the Law on Privatization will be privatized. What is not within the scope of the law will remain: agricultural

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holdings, water management, public utility companies of particular interest, and public companies.

[Stipic] When are you going to privatize those that you have planned to privatize?

[Ivanov] The law obliged all the small and medium-size companies to decide what their privatization model will be by 31 December 1994, and those that did not do so would be privatized by the agency. The deadline set for small and medium-size companies was one year and for large companies two years. The control of the previous privatization, in accordance with Markovic's law, has been completed for the majority of large companies.

[Stipic] How will the companies be privatized? Who will buy their shares?

[Ivanov] There are several methods. Employees will buy shares and we will sell the indivisible part.... [sentence as published]

With medium-size companies 20 percent should be bought in order to have a controlling block of shares, and within a year 51-percent ownership must be achieved for majority ownership. In large companies 10 percent of the shares should be bought for the controlling block, and the conditions are the same for majority ownership—the deadline is one year.

[Stipic] Who will buy the shares?

[Ivanov] Employees can buy shares at a discount of up to 30 percent of the estimated value of the company's capital, the discount depending on years of service. The rest of the shares are sold for cash.

[Stipic] Who has the cash? Who is buying?

[Ivanov] Mostly employees. There are also many companies that have been privatized in accordance with Ante Markovic's law, and which now only need to make additional payments of taxes and fees. Managers are also buying a lot. There have also been several bids, particularly in the tobacco industry, for which we will open the offers in April and decide who to sell to.

[Stipic] Are there any foreign investors?

[Ivanov] In the tobacco industry it is exclusively foreign companies that are making bids; in the timber and wood industry we already have a Swedish company; there is a German company in the textile industry; and there are some foreign companies in shipping. Foreign investors have also expressed interest in the non-ferrous metal industry. Privatization in tourism has been slow. Soon there will be invitations to bid for the management of a large hotel-tourist organization.

[Stipic] You mentioned three large projects. What is next?

[Ivanov] The financial rehabilitation of the banks. The state is taking over the citizens' savings and all the loans for which the state has provided guarantees to foreign investors. All the branches of the Stopanska Banka Skopje that have at least 9 million German marks of capital can break away and become privatized.

[Stipic] Lately there has been talk in the Macedonian public that many employees will be dismissed, particularly in the Skopje iron and steel plant. Why is that?

[Ivanov] We have 25 large loss-making firms and a special law was passed for them. This is what the third project is: the financial rehabilitation of these loss-making firms, which contribute about 50 percent of the losses of the Macedonian economy. They have 44,000 workers, or 14 percent of the total number of those employed in Macedonia. These companies have $1.32 billion losses.

[Stipic] How will you rehabilitate these loss-making firms?

[Ivanov] Their debts to banks, public companies, and the state will turn into shares in the company. Claims could be registered up to 28 February. By 1 May their capital will have been assessed, in accordance with the shortened procedure, and after that there follows the separation of those parts that can continue to work. In September there will be an auction of the shares that the companies have. This is how we will carry out the organizational and ownership restructuring. The government has allocated $75 million from the budget for this project. About 15,000 employees will be given redundancy pay and they will go to the Employment Office. This will require $35 million and $40 million will be the working capital for these companies.

[Stipic] What will happen to the employees who are dismissed?

[Ivanov] For each two years of employment they will get an average month's salary and they will also receive unemployed benefit payments from the Employment Office .

[Stipic] What will happen to them afterwards? Are there any plans for new employment?

[Ivanov] Yes, after the privatization and restructuring, we plan to stimulate employment in small and medium-size companies. In the first two years they are to be exempt from all contributions from salaries except for retirement and health insurance, and the employer is to be exempt from profits tax. We will try to stimulate employment by giving the employer the equivqlent of redundancy payments to pay the employee.

[Stipic] The iron and steel plant is going to close down. Large companies are making losses.... What is the orientation of the Macedonian economy?

[Ivanov] Owing to the present blockade, shipping costs have increased by 40 percent. At this moment it is difficult to determine the profitability of the manufacturing companies that need railroad transport. Macedonia's aim is to regulate trade relations with our

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traditional partners; we have already done that with Slovenia, Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria.

[Stipic] What are your relations with your trading partners?

[Ivanov] This year we would like to conclude main trade agreements with the EU. The arrangement with the World Bank has been successfully completed, and we expect about $200 million of loans to support the balance of payments and for structural reforms, privatization, the social program, and technological help.

[Stipic] What does Macedonia have to offer the world?

[Ivanov] Our orientation is toward food production and processing. First of all, there is lamb; then tobacco, fruit, and wine. At the same time, the textile industry accounts for 12.4 percent of exports. This year we expect about $40 million income from tourism, which is $10 million more than last year. This is, naturally, much less than Croatia's potentials. Other export potentials are leather and chemical products, primarily synthetic fibers. We also consider the freight-forwarding business important, because of the north-south and east-west transit routes.

[Stipic] The Greek blockade has been going on for over a year. However, there are many goods from various countries in your stores. How do they arrive?

[Ivanov] Private enterprise is strong. The goods arrive mainly through Bulgaria. We even have trade with Greece, but with the blockade it goes through Bulgaria. So far there has been no traffic across the border with Greece. They do not allow access to Salonika; we cannot use their railroads or roads.

[Stipic] Have you been negotiating with Greece?

[Ivanov] No, there have been no negotiations as yet. We have had the most problems with oil, which is now coming in oil tankers through Bulgaria. This country is now Macedonia's main access to the world. We have problems with Albania because of their transport facilities: They have no roads, railroads, or ports.

[Stipic] It is said that Macedonia is kind of a duty free shop in this part of the Balkans, and that many goods go to and from Serbia through Macedonian companies.

[Ivanov] We also have a blockade with Serbia, in accordance with the UN resolution. The exchange of agricultural goods and foodstuffs is allowed, as was agreed with the Sanctions Committee. We sell a great deal of food products to them. Before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, over 60 percent of goods went to the Serbian and Montenegrin markets. Now the percentage is much lower and everything is within the framework of the sanctions.

[Stipic] We drank Knjez Milos mineral water [Serbian] here. How come?

[Ivanov] It is probably a question of an exchange of goods. They may have paid for some goods with it.

[Box, p 23] Trade With Croatia

[Stipic] How is cooperation between Croatia and Macedonia?

[Ivanov] According to our estimates, it is below the expected and possible level. There are certainly objective reasons for this, such as transport. In 1994 we had an increase in the overall level of trade. In 1993 it was $83.7 million and last year it was $87.6 million. We are importing more from Croatia. Last year's imports were worth $57.8 million and exports were $29.8 million. However, this is very little compared with the trade that used to take place between the two republics. One of the main reasons, apart from the transport problem, is that we have not signed any main trade or economic agreements on avoiding double taxation or the payment system, which is the basis for good cooperation between two countries.

[Stipic] Why have these agreements not been signed?

[Ivanov] We have been waiting for the Croatian side to confirm this. We cannot blame anyone. We did not have a Croatian ambassador in Macedonia for a long time. Now that one has arrived, there will be the first step toward the signing of the agreements.

[Stipic] What do you import from Croatia the most and what do you sell to Croatia?

[Ivanov] We mostly import fish, spices, tobacco, petrochemical products, and technical goods, and we export lamb, vegetables, wine, alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, and medicine.

Minister Expects $24 Million Loan for Roads

AU1204174595 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 11 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by "M.J.": "Positive Assessments About Transition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "According to the views of the World Bank and the IMF, Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is certainly among the first transitional countries to undertake substantial and effective reforms." This was stated by Minister Ljube Trpeski at yesterday's news conference on the negotiations of the Macedonian delegation and the world financiers in Washington on support for the reforms.

Minister Trpeski announced that on 18 April, the World Bank is expected to grant a loan of $24 million for road construction, of which $10 million will be immediately available as retrospective financing for what has been spent so far for the construction of the Tetovo-Gostivar road. The rest of the credit will be distributed depending on the progress of the work on the highway.

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"The assessments on the reforms in the fields of banking, companies, and social policy have enabled us to complete the negotiations on an $85 million credit for restructuring, as well as a $14 million credit for social purposes," Minister Trpeski said.

As for a FESA [Financial Sector and Enterprises Structural Adjustment] loan, for the first part of which Macedonia has already met all the requirements, Trpeski said that our delegation had managed to obtain 30 percent of the amount for retrospective financing. We have already assigned the National Bank to collect all the documents for exports achieved in the past few months, which will be presented to the World Bank, and as of June the rest will be retrieved.

The Washington visit was also used to draw up a definitive version of a letter about the intentions of the Macedonian Government, and this has now been sent to the IMF. On 5 May the Management Board of the IMF is expected to acknowledge the standby arrangement for $55 million.

Minister Trpeski announced that, after these activities, it has been agreed that the Paris Club will discuss Macedonia's debt to this association's biggest creditor countries.

On 14 April we expect (Willfried Talvitz), deputy president of the World Bank, and (Rachel Lomax), director of the European department, to arrive in our country.

Turkish Defense Minister Arrives in Skopje

LD1204151695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1426 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 12 Apr (TANJUG)—It was announced in Skopje today that Turkish Defense Minister Mehmet Golhan arrived today in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM].

Golhan is to meet Macedonian Defense Minister Blagoje Hamdziski. The two sides are expected to exchange views on the current situation in the region and on future military cooperation.

The Turkish minister is to stay in the FYROM until 15 April. The two sides are expected to sign a treaty on bilateral cooperation "in the field of technical and defense industry."

It has also been announced that Golhan will pay a visit to some units of the Macedonian Army and some special purpose factories.

According to a statement from the FYROM Defense Ministry, the Turkish defense minister will also be received by FYROM President Kiro Gligorov and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski. [passage omitted]

'Continuation of Cooperation'

AU1304092095 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Upon his arrival at Skopje airport, Turkish Minister of National Defense Mehmet Golhan said that this visit is a continuation of cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Turkey.

Our common history and culture are the sources of our future cooperation, and I avail myself of this opportunity to convey the respect of the Turkish people for the Macedonian people. It is our wish to have the Republic of Macedonia as an eternal, stable, peaceful, and prosperous country, and we wish peace and stability to be rooted in this region and to last for ever, he stated.

Macedonian Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski stated: We attach great importance to the visit of the Turkish delegation. The cooperation between our two countries is the basis for development in all fields. We know that, recently, cooperation in the field of defense has reached a high point. We have signed and ratified a number of agreements that produce concrete results. This visit of the Turkish defense minister will give a new impetus to the continuation of this cooperation. The visit will be a busy one. Tomorrow, professional talks will begin, and the Turkish minister will be received by Prime Minister Crvenkovski and President Gligorov. We shall sign an agreement on technical cooperation in the defense industry. There will be visits to a number of army units, some army facilities, and of course, to the town of Bitola, the birth place of Kemal Ataturk.

Problems of 'Porous' Border With Albania Noted

LD1204152695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1151 GMT 12 Apr 95

[By correspondent Mladen Stancic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, April 12 (TANJUG)—The Albanian border with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] is the most porous in Europe, with illegal crossings into FYROM by Albanian hordes of robbers remaining in the background of their 'goodneighborly relations.'

Burdened with the idea of an 'unfavorable political moment,' Skopje authorities are forced to keep quiet about looting and raiding of FYROM border villages on Lake Ohrid, which are a permanent target of armed bandits from the 'West.'

Moreover, illegal trade in drugs, arms, foreign currency and cattle and the white-slave traffic are rampant at the Albanian border where there are hardly any guards at all.

Robbed villagers say that armed robbers from Albania are taking everything they come across, from movables to cattle. Moreover, robbers very often demolish the houses they have previously robbed and sometimes even set fire to them.

Villagers of Radozda have been organizing night watch for some time now. The young and the old that are fit to carry arms have engaged themselves in securing all accesses to the village.

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Villagers say that after several bandits have been killed, robberies are not so frequent as they used to be, but there is still an atmosphere of alertness and insecurity in the village. There is hardly a house that is not robbed at least once a year.

Robbers are mainly from the Albanian border localities of Kotodeshi, Piskupati and some villages further off. They move in bigger or smaller armed gangs, leaving devastation behind.

An arrested Albanian robber told recently to FYROM police that Albanian border guards encouraged robbers to raids with words that the border between Albania and the FYROM hardly existed.

An old fisherman from Lake Ohrid says that if Europe is to follow Albania and FYROM's example in obliterating borders, than its posterity is in for a hard time.

Gligorov Addresses Reserve Army Officers

LD1204173795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1525 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 12 Apr (TANJUG)—In his address to the annual assembly of reserve army officers in Skopje today, Kiro Gligorov, president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], urged peace, good-neighborly relations with open borders, equal cooperation with all, and Europeanization of the Balkans. According to Gligorov, this orientation requires an urgent end to all gory Balkan stories and legacies.

Speaking about the future tasks for the country's defense, Gligorov said that "we ought to view the defense of Macedonia through our own readiness, but also through our admission to collective defense systems. Nobody aspires, these days, to provide defense on their own. Of course, combat readiness and training achievements are a condition for our membership in collective organizations," Gligorov said. He warned the Macedonian Army officers that nobody would be prepared to admit as a member a disorganized and untrained army that is incapable of defending itself.

"Even though we are a small country and are unable to have a big army, in addition, there is a historical burden. In our neighborhood, whatever it is like, we nevertheless have a modern and well-trained army," he said.

Gligorov also spoke about the need to build good interethnic relations as a condition necessary for a successful defense system. This is, according to him, "a huge guarantor of our peace, our future, and the country's security."

Minister Rejects 'Unconstitutional Name' at UN

AU1204192295 Skopje MIC in English 11 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Stevo Crvenkovski gave an interview for the Macedonian Radio yesterday.

In relation to the acceptance of the Republic of Macedonia to the UN under an unconstitutional name, Mr. Crvenkovski said: "Firstly, we have not accepted any unconstitutional name.

The application of the Republic of Macedonia for membership in the UN is with the name Republic of Macedonia. Our entire communication with the UN and with the organizations from the system of the UN is with that name. Also, a good part of the communications of a large number of countries with us is also with that name. We have not accepted, at any moment, any other name of the country except the one that it has. What stands in the resolution of the United Nations is that they will address the Republic of Macedonia in the system of the UN with the formula that is stated there. However, it does not say anywhere and it hasn't been made anywhere that the Republic of Macedonia will appear any differently. And, the Republic of Macedonia is not appearing any differently. And, there are also a great many countries that themselves respect our word and not what has been accepted for internal communication in the UN. Also, most of the publications in the world, encyclopedias, atlases from the most renown publishing houses, already in the first year of acceptance to the UN, cleared up that issue. So, now, in all great encyclopedias, in all great publishing houses that print atlases and maps and make globes, you will find only the name Republic of Macedonia. There are some exceptions, but few, and they are not in the first category of the most prominent publishers."

To the question about the position of the Macedonian national minority in Greece, Minister Crvenkovski said: "It is a fact that closing the eyes before the truth can drive every country into a deep crisis. The sooner a country realizes that and the sooner it gets used to the reality of the situation depends on the overall situation in every country. If some country has a negative discriminating attitude toward a segment of its citizens, that country can not develop a democratic system, as a whole, in the long-run. Democracy can not be based on different treatments. In 21st century Europe, a country in which democracy is not based on legal foundations will not be able to function. Although because of its attitude toward the minorities a country slows down its own democratic development, at the same time, it is slowing down its own path toward integration in the world trends and is inflicting lasting damage to all its citizens, and not only the minorities. Therefore, I am convinced that the problem with the minorities will be a key question of the overall development of the countries in this region. And also those country that can not gather up enough courage to face the problem with the minorities, I'm afraid that they will have a difficult future," Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski said in the interview for the Macedonian Radio.

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Thaler Views EU Membership, Regional Relations

AU1204133695 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 8 Apr 95 pp 31-32

[Interview with Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler by Janko Lorenci; place and date not given: "When One Is Photographed in a Bad Moment"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Lorenci] Mr. Minister, would you dare venture to forecast as to when we will become a member of the European Union?

[Thaler] This truly is a dare: By the year 2004.

[Lorenci] You are, therefore, convinced that sooner or later we will become a member?

[Thaler] I am convinced about very few things and I also would not bet my right arm. Essentially, I believe in general trends and the emergence of the European Union, which will entail a great portion of the continent, primarily because of the global rearrangement and amalgamation of forces that are taking place elsewhere (North America, the Pacific region, East Asia, Europe). This will compel Europe into organizing itself to be able to compete with other centers of power. Of course, there will also be party interests, deviations, and rapprochements. From this point of view, it is difficult to be a prophet.

[Lorenci] Now that you can hear any relevant opinions better, does it seem to you that those who intimately decide on the European Union seriously see Slovenia as a future member of the Union?

[Thaler] I believe they do. However, they do not perceive us as something special, but as a part of the process which is in a way still an adventure. Those in charge are daily taxed with much more prosaic problems of how to control this vast conglomerate with the institutions designed for six countries, so to speak, that must now function for 15 countries. Before any further widening of the European Union they will probably really change or adjust "the constitution" of the European Union, to ensure a balance between a country's right to veto a certain decision and the right of the majority to nevertheless decide.

[Lorenci] From the Slovene point of view, Euroskepticism is probably the most natural stance at the moment?

[Thaler] That is true. It is interesting and in a way quite incomprehensible how much we oscillate in our attitudes. We are either very depressed and blue or very euphoric—this also applies for the crucial moments in our history. The changes are dramatic: From the euphoria at the turn of the decade we are moving rapidly toward serious Euroskepticism. I believe that din time we will level out with the Euroskepticism in other European countries.

[Lorenci] How do you interpret this turnabout?

[Thaler] There are probably several levels of explanation. A simplified psychological explanation says: While a fruit or a toy is unreachable it is very attractive and the desire for it is great. Once it arrives within a hand's reach the desire for it subsides. When we were gaining our independence Europe was an absolutely positive concept also because it represented an antipode to Belgrade, which personified an obstacle to our European tendencies. When we gained independence we first gained the opportunity to negotiate with Brussels directly. This happened for the first time during the visits of today's not exactly popular troikas. Euroskepticism today definitely feeds off Italy's failed resistance to our European ambitions. Our pronounced and declared hastiness on the way to Europe obviously created a false impression with the Italians: It seemed to them that this was the most suitable lever to pull to apply pressure on Slovenia in order to achieve their particular interests. They tried to force us into concessions like children, by moving away the desired object. Such an Italian stance triggered a logical reaction: If Europe is like Italy, well, thank you very much. Our partners in Brussels are aware that this could have serious consequences.

[Lorenci] So, the currently evident Slovene Euroskepticism is actually a plus in the negotiations with the European Union and Italy?

[Thaler] That is so.

[Lorenci] One of the reasons for the Euroskepticism is probably also that we only gained our independence yesterday, so to speak, and joining the European Union would again take away a part of our sovereignty?

[Thaler] This, again, should not be neglected. However, I repeat once more: There is an impression that giving away sovereignty will go against or in favor of Italy. I think that the people can differentiate between such unilateral ceding of a part of sovereignty and the ceding of sovereignty to Brussels, which currently represents 15, and potentially 25 countries. It is easier to cede sovereignty to a family of 25 nations, where everybody is doing this and is also gaining something.

[Lorenci] So far none of the parties has openly played on the card of autarchy, that is, opposition to the European Union, yet. Will this happen sooner of later?

[Thaler] It probably will happen sooner or later. However, Europe as a positive concept still prevails. [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] Don't you think that joining the European Union nevertheless seriously threatens Slovene sovereignty and identity? Well, the identity is endangered in any case unless we close up completely.

[Thaler] These are the topics that will require numerous debates. They neither have one single meaning nor are they easily comprehensible. If we were to close up completely, any economist can tell you that this would destroy us in 10 or 20 years. We have had examples of

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this (Albania, Romania) in close proximity. This debate is actually all about temperance, finding the best ratio between opening up and protecting the national essence. Here I agree with those who say that the state should nevertheless intervene in some key segments and protect the nation's strategic interests, among other things, also in the economic sphere.

[Lorenci] Joining the European Union will actually only sharpen the dilemma which Slovenia already has to solve at present: To find a precarious equilibrium between openness and closeness, uniqueness and worldliness, and so on. Luckily we are already up to our necks in this process and it seems that no major fear about the loss of identity is needed. The Slovenes are actually hardcore patriots.

[Thaler] That is correct. When we were dissatisfied with Yugoslavia we compared it to the European Community of that time and said that it was, just as this was the case with the Soviet Union and the CSSR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic], an unnatural alliance which introduced domination of the biggest nation over smaller ones, ideology over practical economic links, and so forth. However, the European community is all about interest linking based on economy. I would like to state the following: I do not see the European Union as a direct danger which would threaten the Slovene national interests and the survival of the nation. The differences in the size of European nations are, of course, great but on the other hand there are many in the Union who have similar concerns as ourselves. This is especially pronounced among a group of 10 member candidates. This cartel of small, threatened, and anxious countries will strengthen further in order to be able to prevent such processes. Also, according to the Union plans once the Union has 25 members a citizen of Luxembourg will have eight times the voting power of a German citizen. This awareness exists within the Union and they are looking for a compromise between a state, its size, and its voting power. Therefore, I believe that dangers to our national essence and other things will with the entry into the Union be at an entirely different level than when we were quarreling about common core subjects [in education] and about other, also physical, threats.

[Lorenci] Why do we still lack a clear checklist of advantages and disadvantages of our country joining or not joining the Union?

[Thaler] Something has been done. There were numerous studies, also quantitative ones, which laid out various scenarios and possibilities. The problem is that this is not sufficiently centralized and translated into the political language at the government level.

[Lorenci] Did you give any personal encouragement?

[Thaler] We have strengthened the activities. We have finally appointed the director of the Bureau for European Affairs, Dr. Benjamin Lukman. This bureau together with the representatives of other ministries is negotiating on the EU associate membership. It must compile a serious project of scenarios and various possibilities, and ultimately, promote this project so that the voters will be well informed in the final phase.

In many ways this work became deadlocked and not much has happened for nearly a year and a half—to recap, this was the period "of the agony of the Italian veto." In purely psychological terms this has gradually choked off the activities in this sector, because after December 1993 when the government passed a memorandum on seeking to join the Union, we waited for those crucial dates each month. [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] Foreign policy is by definition a matter of national interest. It is also in a way above political parties. You, of course, are a party man. How do you resolve this paradox?

[Thaler] I am a party man because we have a party, that is, a pluralist democracy. I fought for it in the second half of the eighties when the Alliance of the Socialist Youth of Slovenia realized that we do not need the reforms of socialism but a way out of it. We realized very quickly that the recipe for this lay in organization of the free pluralist elections. For this reason we transformed ourselves into a party and since there were more other parties we were able to hold elections. I have never considered myself to be an overtly party man. The purpose of parties is to organize a policy of a given country relatively rationally, to ensure competitiveness, and thus raise the quality of politics (internal and external) in general. On the other hand parties should at least in principle take care of our national interest. Because we see these in different ways it is logical that we have different parties, left, right, and so on.

Foreign policy is definitely a realm that requires self-restraint. On the other hand, so does the championing of national interests. Foreign policy is, therefore, a sphere which requires amalgamation of the nation's forces and within this context also of the political and party forces.

[Lorenci] It has become perfectly commonplace for individual ministers to propagate their parties openly. Your party probably also expects this from you?

[Thaler] As concerns myself and my department, this proves once again that the stereotype about the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] being an extremely well organized party aspiring to control all sorts of things, is just not valid. I sometimes even wish that the LDS would concentrate more on this sphere and support my efforts further. Essentially, therefore, there are no hints or expectations attached to me. It is true, however, that when I took office at the end of January I was surprised not to find a single person in the so-called ministers' cabinet, which in all foreign ministries forms a sort of a core that facilitates the work of the minister himself and liaises with other departments. All who used to be in this cabinet left together with the minister. Therefore, they were not professional or career diplomats. I nevertheless

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found people who were in the ministry and were professionals. The moral of the story: This department does not withstand any improvisation.

[Lorenci] On the other hand, one must remain powerful and influential within the party in order to keep a government position. This is an organic, perhaps, a psychologically risque connection?

[Thaler] Doubtlessly. However, the truth is that I do not have any functions in the LDS, apart from being a member of the party council, which is a very numerous body. I do not belong to those who think that it is important to climb up the party promotional ladder as high as possible and use this as a springboard for posts in the administration.

[Lorenci] However, this has already become the rule in Slovenia.

[Thaler] Well, in numerous parties there are still many people who hold high posts but are not engaged at the state level. [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] The influence of any individual minister probably depends greatly on his relationship with the prime minister.

[Thaler] This should not be neglected, especially when it comes to the prime minister, the secretary general, and so forth. [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] Has Prime Minister Drnovsek in your brief career ever crucially intervene in your foreign political activity? Has he correct you or has anything of the kind ever occur?

[Thaler] I believe that this would not have passed unnoticed in the public. I do not recall such an occasion. I had known earlier what has only been confirmed recently, namely, that the prime minister and myself are very much in harmony as regards strategic directives.

[Lorenci] You are the chief executor of the foreign policy. Are you also its creator?

[Thaler] I avoid exaggeration and bragging. As a foreign minister one is at the intersection of information and requirements to decide. Objectively speaking, this by itself leads to creativity. I, therefore, think that I am what you are asking me about. All the time I seek and allow communication with others who have their role in this sector—the prime minister, the president of the state, the speaker of the parliament, the head of parliamentary committee, and other "opinion makers" and factors here.

[Lorenci] The existence of several centers of decision-making in foreign policy is usually considered to be something bad. However, it probably has it bright sides, too. In this way plurality manifests itself and ultimately also synthesis, based on various opinions. Besides, this is probably a welcome assistance for your cadre and intellectually impoverished administration....

[Thaler] There cannot be several centers of decisionmaking....

[Lorenci] ....well, perhaps influences....

[Thaler] There is nothing wrong if there are several centers of influence, that is to say, institutions which generate ideas, alternatives, variants, and so forth. However, because we do not have, for example, a national security council which would discuss various, also foreign policy issues at the strategic level, the foreign policy reins must be kept in the hands of the government through the Foreign Ministry, which is controlled by the parliament. We must not allow anybody to pursue his own independent foreign policy. If there is regular communication, consultations, negotiations—which now exist—then the problems can be resolved easier than it has appeared until recently.

[Lorenci] So, in the foreign policy now the right hand knows what the left hand is doing?

[Thaler] A part of the right hand says that there is an informal center of power to whom "Thaler is merely an obedient puppet who humbly implements the directives of the national communist center of power." Well, joke aside: The right hand knows what the left hand does and vice versa.

[Lorenci] And you are the head?

[Thaler] No comment.

[Lorenci] It seems to me that when you were not foreign minister yet, you never smiled as heartily as you do now during official meetings with foreign politicians.

[Thaler] Obviously, I had fewer reasons for it. [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] Does your youth, of which there was talk at the beginning of your term of office, pose any obstacles?

[Thaler] This is a toss-up between advantages and disadvantages. I believe that advantages prevail.

[Lorenci] It is often forgotten that despite your youth you had considerably more experience that Rupel and Peterle, when they became foreign ministers.

[Thaler] Yes. That was a romantic area of our foreign policy of which I have the best of memories. From this viewpoint I have had it easier. In a matter of few hours and days I revved the department up, because I knew the infrastructure and the way things work in this department. [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] Is Slovenia economically already tied too much to the European Union?

[Thaler] Too much? I would avoid this label myself. We should strengthen our links with other parts of the world. In general, we need more of a policy that would be aware of itself and behave strategically. Concretely, we should strengthen links (speaking of economic ones) primarily

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with the United States, Russia, the Asian Tigers, Japan, and also some developing countries, where, when we were still nonaligned, we performed a sort of the economic role while Belgrade played the political role of the Nonaligned Movement.

[Lorenci] Are the limits of diversification, which is basically needed, probably rather narrow because of our small size?

[Thaler] Yes.

[Lorenci] Within the European Union we seem to be extremely dependent on the German-speaking region. Is the influence of this region perhaps not too strong already?

[Thaler] The connection with this region will always be very pronounced for various reasons. What is important is that we have a policy which is backed by the government and the parliament and that the relations with the chief European forces, the United States, and Russia are balanced. We are to a degree successful here.

[Lorenci] Two extreme opinions have emerged regarding the future relations with the former Yugoslavia. According to the first, there is an outstanding economic potential in the reanimation of cooperation with this region. According to the second, there is not such potential because this is a long-term wasteland region.

[Thaler] Here I am inclined toward moderate assessments and views. This region should not be overestimated; however, it should not be underestimated either. Our relations with Croatia, with which we are negotiating intensively, is a separate issue. Next week, [Croatian Foreign] Minister Granic will arrive in Ljubljana and this will be the last preparation prior to the meeting of prime ministers. We have a serious intention of closing certain issues that have been open since 1991.

Then there is Bosnia, at present somehow reduced to a question whether Slovenia should or should not stick to its principled stance—a unified state, Bosnia-Herzegovina as an international entity, and so forth. There have been some doubts, also because we have forgotten about symbolic gestures. I will soon travel to Sarajevo myself.

The question of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is specific. I believe that we must display understanding for their problems, also economic ones, and somehow create the atmosphere for a positive trend of our economic presence. To put it simply, perhaps it is better that we import a little more of their wine and other things than that we play games and because of them sell less on their market.

The so-called FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is a topic in itself. Normalization of relations will take place sooner or later, in one, five, or 50 years. This will definitely be a gradual process. We are now preparing the opening of our bureau in Belgrade which will have little diplomatic significance; its purpose will be to maintain some basic communication and it will be an outpost that will facilitate protection of the interests of our citizens who are in Serbia or occasionally travel there.

This entire debate is burdened considerably with emotions, however, also with a realistic danger that any additional opening toward Belgrade would be misunderstood in the sense that Slovenia implicitly accepts these or other theories about Yugoslavia's reconstruction. Such ideas are springing into life regularly. It is no coincidence that we prevented rather bluntly a visit by President Suharto's special envoy, chief of the Nonaligned Movement, who tried to establish links with all presidents of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. I championed a rather harsh stance because I am aware how important gestures and symbols are in politics. Had there been an impression that there exists an action or an idea that would succeed in bringing together the five states of the former Yugoslavia (and Slovenia would participate in it), this would be a reference that they would be able to quote months or years later and implicitly it would somehow be understood that we are in favor of such a project. Many people offer good services of this kind. Among them are also people who are not exactly familiar with the entire story, especially not with the story of Yugoslavia at the end of the eighties, when presidents met very frequently and very unsuccessfully. There are also many people who know the story well but have other interests which, of course, are not our interests. For these reasons, I personally favor considerable caution in the establishment of links and also as regards symbolic gestures and activities.

[Lorenci] However, there probably is no realistic or great danger that Yugoslavia would be resurrected, if even in a looser form.

[Thaler] I agree. For as long as people look at each other through rifle sights it really is difficult to talk about this. However, we simply do not need to land in certain projects for which there is no need for us to be a part. [passage omitted]

Possible Coalition Formation for '96 Elections

AU1204161495 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A coalition of parties of the Slovene spring is already in the making for next year's parliamentary elections, Janez Podobnik [name as heard] announced at a Slovene Peoples' Party new conference today. The coalition will supposedly consist of Slovene Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and the Slovene Peoples' Party, which will reportedly also be joined by other minor political parties from this side of the political spectrum that will succeed in entering the parliament.

According to Marjan Podobnik, such a coalition will be able to secure a majority in the parliament and appoint a prime minister designate. [passage omitted]

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Federal

Reports on Helicopter Flights From Bosnia Denied

LD1204204295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1800 GMT 12 Apr 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New York, Apr. 12 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Ambassador to the United Nations Dragomir Djokic denied Wednesday claims about alleged helicopter flights from Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In its latest report for March the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia observer mission said radar at Belgrade's Surcin airport picked up traces of flights of 26 helicopters from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Yugoslavia. The observer mission has since September 1994 been monitoring the border Yugoslavia closed toward Bosnia for all goods apart from humanitarian aid.

Consequently, anti-Yugoslav sanctions in the areas of international air and ferry traffic, collective sports and culture were suspended for a period of 100 days.

The U.N. Security Council imposed in May 1992 comprehensive and binding sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro over its alleged involvement in the war in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a letter to Security Council president for April Ambassador Karel Kovanda of the Czech Republic, Djokic said there was a total of only six flights from Bosnia to Yugoslavia and vice-versa. Of the six, four were approved by the U.N. Protection Force and two were performed without authorization. The flights were used for urgent evacuation of the seriously wounded.

Recalling the fact that the observer mission report too said that the observers in the field failed to record the helicopter flights, Djokic pointed out that it could not be ruled out other helicopter flights note in the vicinity belonged to the Muslims.

Djokic said it was possible that special electronic devices were used to deliberately simulate the flights so as to put the blame on Bosnian Serbs or on the Yugoslav side. The U.N. Security Council is expected to hear the observer mission report for March on which depended whether if the suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia would be prolonged.

UN Sanctions Discussed With Italian Delegation

LD1204220095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1916 GMT 12 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 12 (TANJUG)—Lifting of U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia is the chief prerequisite for speedy peace in the region, it was heard during Yugoslav-Italian talks in Belgrade on Wednesday.

Yugoslav Assistant Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic and a delegation of the Italian Democratic Left Party agreed that lifting of the sanctions would result in overcoming the serious economic, social and humanitarian problems plaguing the region. The Italian party delegation is headed by Pierro Fassino of the party's national executive committee, who is also vice-president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

The talk brought to light Yugoslavia's role in and contribution to the peace process in the former Yugoslavia. Both sides showed an interest in intensifying political dialogue and understanding between the two neighboring and friendly countries.

Results of Qian Qichen Visit, PRC Policy

LD1204122395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1201 GMT 12 Apr 95

["Pool" item, by diplomatic editor Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 12 (TANJUG)—A three-day official visit to Yugoslavia by Chinese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, which ended on Wednesday, showed that China has retained its specific and original stand toward Yugoslavia.

China has never questioned Yugoslavia's continuity and, unlike western countries, has never planned to withdraw its ambassador from Belgrade. China was also the only permanent member of the United Nations Security Council that had not voted for resolution 757 on imposing the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Consequently, Yugoslavia attached great importance to the visit even before Qian's arrival and expected significant results from it. Official Yugoslav sources said Wednesday that all expectations had been justified and that Qian's visit was indeed highly important and its results significant.

Qian met in Belgrade with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav jovanovic, Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, Yugoslav parliament's lower house speaker Radoman Bozovic, Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and Montenegrin Premier Milo Djukanovic.

The results of Qian's visit proved to be significant in both bilateral and international domains. In the bilateral domain, Qian and Yugoslav officials signed a program of cultural and educational cooperation for 1995 and 1996,

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which is the first inter-state document Yugoslavia has signed since the suspension of the sanctions in the area of culture.

Another inter-state document—a general agreement on economic and trade cooperation—is about to be signed. Qian also informed officials in Belgrade that the Chinese Government had passed a decision on sending considerable relief aid to Yugoslavia. One of the concrete results of the visit was a firm agreement to maintain contacts on different levels and in different fields.

Diplomatic sources in Yugoslavia said Qian's visit was also specific for having rounded off a phase in Yugoslavia's diplomatic offensive. They mentioned Norwegian foreign minister's recent visit to Yugoslavia and Yugoslav foreign minister's visit to Italy and the Vatican. They also stressed the fact that Qian was the fourth foreign minister of the five permanent U.N. Security Council members to visit Belgrade since the imposition of the sanctions.

The visit is viewed primarily in the light of the attention China devotes to the Balkan region. Qian said more than once that China was geographically far away from the Balkans and, therefore, had no selfish interests in the region.

However, China obviously does not want to stand aside in any of the region where major powers are confronted. China therefore believes it could play a more impartial role in the region than some other factors. China's advocacy of the lifting of the anti-Yugoslav sanctions is another prominent aspect of Qian's visit.

China knows from its own experience what sanctions are, as well as external pressures, isolation and interfering in internal affairs of another country, and this is the motive for its vocal advocacy of a full removal of the sanctions against Yugoslavia. It remains to be seen to what extent China will carry out these stands in the U.N. Security Council. Qian said the issue of the sanctions against Yugoslavia was virtually on the Council's agenda.

Kosovo

Money Offered to Belgrade for Albanians' Return

AU1204095695 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 12 Apr 95 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Kosovo: 'Head Money' for Return of Refugees?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna—Germany and Switzerland are said to have offered the Belgrade government some kind of "head money" if the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] takes back Kosovo Albanians who escaped abroad. This was stated by Adem Demaci, leading politician of the Kosovo Albanians, at a news conference in Vienna on 11 April.

Albanians Feel Unprotected, 'Anything Can Happen'

AU1204133595 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 11 Apr 95

[Telephone report by Leke Musolli from Prishtina]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a report by the Independent Trade Unions of Kosova [BSPK], which may not be complete, more than 500 Albanians so far with a residence permit in Kosova have been violently evicted from their homes and Serbs and Montenegrins settled there instead, some of whom are colonists who have come from Bosnia and Croatia.

However, the incident that occurred in Prishtina on Tuesday [11 April] testifies to the fact that Albanians are totally unprotected and insecure and that anything can happen in Kosova. The house of Dr. Rasim Hoxha in Ulpjane was blocked by Serbian police forces who asked him to abandon the home he had bought before 1981, from Zika Jokanovic, and for which he had paid 400,000 German marks.

Nonofficial sources report that for the second time, the Serbian court has rejected as baseless a request by Vladimira Yukanovic, who is said to have been divorced from her husband and insists of returning to the house sold 15 years ago. The police have removed all the furniture and other things from Dr. Hoxha's house. However, Dr. Rasim Hoxha and his five-member family still refuse to leave their home.

When a Serbian inspector asked Vladimira Yukanovic who told her to undertake such an action, she answered that Momcilo Trajkovic ordered her to do so. Trajkovic is known in Kosova as an ultranationalist and member of the so-called movement of the Serbian resistance in Kosova which, as a sign of dissatisfaction with Serb measures against Albanians, have threatened to organize anti-Albanian rallies in Kosova.

TANJUG on Rift Among Ethnic Albanians

LD1304102295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0125 GMT 13 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 13 Apr (TANJUG)—Following the disintegration of a number of smaller political parties of Albanians that could not "compete" with the considerably more influential and larger Democratic Union of Kosovo [DSK], the "Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo" seems to be threatened with "extinction" for the same reasons despite the fact that, according to [ethnic] Albanian press, the organization has about 200,000 members.

It is indicative that reports about the union's disintegration have been appearing in the DSK newspaper, BUJKU, which has on several occasions accused the union and its leader Hajrulah Gorani of "disobedience and refusal to cooperate with [DSK leader] Rugova."

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Gorani regularly rejected to report to Rugova about and to account for trade union activities. This subsequently led to a rift in the trade union organization with one group insisting that the union must be accountable to the self-styled "president of the republic" and the other, including Gorani, advocating "an independent and non-political organization representing workers."

It is interesting that the latest conflict inside the union flared up when Gorani said that [ethnic] Albanian judges should compete for posts in Kosovo-Metohija courts. This was contrary to the views of many, including the association that rallies Albanian lawyers, that Albanian judges should not work in "Serbian courts."

Gorani is also being accused of failing "to use the potential of about 100,000 unemployed"; in other words, of opposing any idea of "lawful protest" advocated by individuals who at the beginning of 1989 organized the notorious miners' strike in Trepca mine.

The trade union organization of former miners of the Stari Trg pit is headed by Aziz Abrasi and Burhan Kavaja, the then directors of Trepca, and until recently deputy chairmen of the Union, who went "independent" after submitting written resignations to Gorjani without prior warning.

Gorani countered various statements and accusations of "working against workers" and of being "autocratic and disobedient" by saying that he was "never member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and does not know how to operate in line with a totalitarian system" and that, unlike Abrasi and Kavaja, he never occupied any state or political position.

Local commentators insist that behind these developments is the radical section of the DSK leadership and their plan to install Kavaja and Abrasi, known for their extreme separatist activities, to head the union.

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